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Interpretation of Pathological Arbitration 
 Agreements:  
Non-existing and Inaccessible Elements 
 
Dr. Morten Frank* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
A distinctive—but common—pathology exists when the arbitration agreement re-
fers to an arbitration institution or to institutional arbitration rules which simply do not 
exist.1  Accordingly, the arbitration agreement contains a non-existing element.  It is 
characteristic that the arbitration agreement contains standard features and—as com-
mercial arbitration agreements most often do—refers to a specific arbitration institution.  
For instance: “the New York Commercial Arbitration Association”, “the American 
Arbitration Society in Bakersfield, California”, “the United States Council of Arbitra-
tion”, “the Copenhagen Maritime Arbitrators Association”, or “the International Arbi-
tration Center of European countries”. 
                                                      
* Dr. Morten Frank is senior associate in Gorrissen Federspiel’s Dispute Resolution group.  He holds a PhD from 
University of Copenhagen, LL.M from National University of Singapore as well as a LL.M from New York Uni-
versity School of Law and is admitted to the New York State Bar.  His PhD thesis comprised a comparative study 
of around 400 judgments on the interpretation of defective/pathological commercial arbitration agreements from 
seven different jurisdictions (USA, England, Singapore, Hong Kong, Sweden, Norway and Denmark).  Additional-
ly, Dr. Morten Frank is the author of a number of articles on the topic. The author would like to thank attorney-at-
law Gregers Gam for his valuable contributions to this article. 
1 Lawrence Boo, The Enforcement of Arbitration Agreements under Article 8 of the Model Law, in  THE UN-
CITRAL MODEL LAW AFTER TWENTY-FIVE YEARS: GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES ON INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL 
ARBITRATION 29, 43, (Frédéric Bachand & Fabien Gélinas eds., 2013) (“common”); SIMON GREENBERG, CHRIS-
TOPHER KEE & J. ROMESH WEERAMANTRY, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: AN ASIA-PACIFIC 
PERSPECTIVE 1, 200 (2011) (“the most common,” and references therein); JULIAN D.M. LEW, LOUKAS A. MISTELIS 
& STEFAN MICHAEL KRÖLL, COMPARATIVE INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION ¶¶ 7–75, (2003) (“A 
typical defect”); JAN PAULSSON, ET AL., INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE ARBITRATION 1, 130 (3rd ed. 
2000) (“probably the most frequent one”). 
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The examples initially appear to be realistic designations, which are hardly distin-
guishable from the names of existing institutions.  In other words, the pathology is not 
visible to the naked (untrained) eye and therefore typically only surfaces when a party is 
about to initiate arbitration proceedings and finds that the institution in question does 
not actually exist.  However, this is not an issue if—despite inaccurate or incorrect des-
ignation—it is in reality clear from the circumstances, which institution is referred to.  
It is likewise not an issue if the non-existent element is merely stated as an exam-
ple, e.g. “such as the rules of the London Arbitration Association”.2  Correspondingly, 
this is the case if the reference in the arbitration agreement is not to a specific institu-
tion, but on a more general level refers to e.g. “an arbitrary commission applying 
French laws.”3 
In most cases, it is a matter of conjecture as to how non-existent elements find their 
way into commercial contracts. Case law rarely discusses the reasons behind it.4  How-
ever, it is not difficult to imagine how the parties reach an agreement on institutional 
arbitration in New York but fail to pay sufficient attention to the name of the institution.  
Something including “Association,” “Center,” or “Chamber” is a good guess, and due 
to haste, the parties do not check the exact names.  Alternatively, it may simply be due 
to bad (machine) translations.  However, there are no examples in case law providing 
the basis for questioning the parties’ good faith in respect of the non-existence; which is 
moreover consistent with the fact that the phenomenon often involves foreign (non-
local) parties or parties drafting in a foreign language.5 
Closely related to the non-existing elements are the cases where the arbitration 
agreement refers to an institution or a person that exists (or has existed), but which due 
to other circumstances is inaccessible to the parties, e.g. because the institution refuses 
to handle the appointment and administrate the process, or because the person in ques-
tion is no longer practising or is fully booked.6  In the following, inaccessible elements 
are included concurrently with non-existing elements, while the main focus—in accord-
ance with the concentration of case law—will be on the latter.7 
                                                      
2 Republic of Nicaragua v. Standard Fruit Co., 937 F.2d 469, 473 (9th Cir. 1991) (emphasis added). 
3 Jain v. de Mere, 51 F.3d 686, 688 (7th Cir. 1995). 
4 But see HKL Group Co. Ltd. v. Rizq Int’l Holding Pte. Ltd., [2013] SGHCR 5, ¶ 2 (“This clause was drafted 
without legal assistance . . . .”); Lucky-Goldstar Int’l (H.K.) Ltd. v. Ng Moo Kee Eng’g Ltd., [1993] 1 H.K.C. 404, 
408 (H.K.) (“I imagine the problem is caused by contract drafters not drafting in their native tongue . . . .”); Stand-
ard Fruit Co., 937 F.2d at 473 (9th Cir. 1991) (“‘deep sense of urgency on both sides,’ the ‘exceedingly tight time 
schedule,’ and the ‘highly political nature of the agreement . . . .’  [D]uring the negotiation themselves, neither side 
could remember the name of the arbitration body in London . . . .”). 
5 See Lucky-Goldstar Int’l (H.K.) Ltd., [1993] 1 H.K.C. at 408 (“Many contract drafters seem to have difficulty in 
the fairly simple task of drafting an arbitration clause or even replicating a standard form clause. . . . I imagine the 
problem is caused by contract drafters not drafting in their native tongue”). 
6 See generally id. 
7 If the inaccessibility is caused by subsequent circumstances (i.e. after the conclusion of the arbitration agreement), 
it may be argued that the instance cannot be qualified as a ‘pathology’ (see further in Part II below).  However, as 
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Arbitration agreements with non-existing or inaccessible elements are pathological, 
because the agreed terms of the arbitration process (the procedural rule) de facto are 
inoperable.  Based on the distinction between jurisdictional allocation and procedural 
rules the following scenarios exist:8  
(1) The procedural rule is ‘curable’: In the analysis, an existing or accessible ele-
ment is identified and the arbitration agreement is enforced in its entirety (Solution 1). 
(2) The procedural rule is ‘incurable,’ but the pathology does not ‘infect’ the ju-
risdictional allocation: The pathological procedural rule is severed and the jurisdiction-
al allocation is enforced; the arbitration agreement is potentially supplemented with 
new (‘healthy’) procedural rules (Solution 2). 
(3) The procedural rule is ‘incurable’ and ‘infects’ the jurisdictional allocation: 
The pathology is fatal to the jurisdictional allocation and the arbitration agreement is 
disregarded in its entirety (Solution 3). 
There is hardly any doubt that if the circumstances of a case provide the basis for 
establishing that the parties in reality intended to refer to a specific existing or accessi-
ble institution/person, the arbitration agreement will be interpreted accordingly (Solu-
tion 1).9  This is consistent with the general contract law interpretation principles.  
However, case law shows that such basis rarely exists,10 which undeniably correlates 
with the arbitration agreement’s status as a midnight clause.11  Therefore—in practice—
the choice typically stands between Solution 2 and Solution 3. 
                                                                                                                                          
case law does not provide a basis for making a distinction in this regard, such a distinction will not be pursued in 
the following. 
8 See infra Part II concerning the components of the arbitration agreement. 
 
9 See Laboratorios Grossman, S.A. v. Forest Labs., Inc., 295 N.Y.S.2d 756, 757 (N.Y. App. Div. 1968) (“[I]f it 
should be found that the parties really intended to arbitrate pursuant to the rules of the Inter-American Commercial 
Arbitration Commission [as submitted by one of the parties], then arbitration before that tribunal should be di-
rected, and nothing further need be determined.”). 
10 See Tennessee Imports, Inc. v. Filippi, 745 F. Supp. 1314, 1326 (M.D. Tenn. 1990) (where the arbitration agree-
ment’s reference to the non-existent “Arbitration Court of Chamber of Commerce in Venice (Italy)” was interpret-
ed as an agreement on ICC arbitration in Venice (Italy), as submitted by the Italian party and unchallenged by the 
American counterparty). 
11 See, e.g. NIGEL BLACKABY, CONSTANTINE PARTASIDES, ALAN REDFERN & MARTIN HUNTER, REDFERN & 
HUNTER ON INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION ¶ 1.01, 2.04 (6th ed. 2015) (“These [arbitration] clauses are often 
‘midnight clauses’—that is, the last clauses to be considered in contract negotiations, sometimes late at night or in 
the early hours of the morning.  Insufficient thought is given to how disputes are to be resolved (possibly because 
the parties are reluctant to contemplate falling into dispute), and an inappropriate and unwieldy compromise is 
often adopted”); GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 771 (2d ed. 2014) (“Indeed, it is 
surprising how frequently parties purport to enter into gravely defective or ‘pathological’ arbitration agreements.”); 
KAJ HOBÉR, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION IN SWEDEN 1, 142 (1st ed. 2011) (“These simple facts 
notwithstanding, arbitration clauses are still being neglected by contract negotiators.  They are often saved until the 
end of the negotiations”); LEW ET AL., supra note 1, at ¶¶ 8-2, (2003) (“The arbitration clause is frequently includ-
ed late in contract negotiations, sometimes as a boilerplate clause or as an afterthought, without debate or consider-
ation of the specific needs of the case.”); PAULSSON, ET AL., supra note 1, at 128 (“Some negotiators seem to 
believe they can remain in limbo, poised timorously somewhat between arbitration and ordinary court action and 
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A narrow linguistic interpretation supports Solution 3, because the non-existing or 
inaccessible element—the procedural rule—can inherently not be carried through.12  
However, weighing against Solution 3 is the fact that the arbitration agreement—
discounting the non-existing or inaccessible element—typically does not give rise to 
calling the jurisdictional allocation into question.13  By way of illustration see the fol-
lowing arbitration agreement: “All disputes shall be finally settled by arbitration in New 
York in accordance with the Commercial Arbitration Rules of the New York Commer-
cial Arbitration Association” (emphasis added).14 
Even though the ‘Arbitration Association’ in question does not exist, there is, all 
other things being equal, no reason to doubt that the arbitration clause is based on an 
intention of the parties to settle disputes by arbitration (in New York).  Thus, the ques-
tion is, whether the jurisdictional allocation and the unenforceable procedural rule are 
inseparably linked—i.e. whether the pathological procedural rule ‘infects’ the jurisdic-
tional allocation (Solution 3)—or whether the jurisdictional allocation as expressed in 
the arbitration agreement survives the pathology (Solution 2).  
                                                                                                                                          
not needing to strike out on one path or the other until a dispute arises.  This is a fallacy.”); PAUL A. GÉLINASAR-
BITRATION CLAUSES: ACHIVING EFFECTIVENESS, IN IMPROVING THE EFFICIENCY OF ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS 
AND AWARDS: 40 YEARS OF APPLICATION OF THE NEW YORK CONVENTION 47 (Albert Jan van den Berg ed., 1999) 
(“How many contracts providing for arbitration are negotiated and drafted with any arbitration expertise input?  I 
venture to say that only a minimal number benefit from any real contribution in this regard.”); Eric Robin, What 
Companies Expect of International Commercial Arbitration, 9 J. INT’L ARB. 31, 32 (1992) (“Very often that clause 
is the last to be discussed by the parties in their negotiations.  In a hurry to finalize their negotiations, they often 
tend to overlook it.  Was the contract not the subject of lengthy and arduous discussion!  It is, therefore, difficult to 
conceive that it should contain any ambiguity: there was provision for every possibility, everything was in order.  Is 
it not unbecoming to envisage a dispute even before finalizing negotiations?  Would that not awake doubts in the 
other party's mind and make him suspect bad faith and thus compromise the long-awaited finalization?  In addition, 
engineers or businessmen are not at ease in the field of pure law.”); Piero Bernardini, The Arbitration Clause of an 
International Contract, 9 J. INT’L ARB. 45, 45 (1992) (“This lack of attention is usually explained by the fact that 
the negotiators of both parties tend to concentrate their efforts on the economic, financial and commercial terms of 
the deal they intend to conclude and are not prepared, once agreement is reached on those terms, to run the risk of 
discussions being reopened and the signing of the agreement being delayed for what they consider to be simply one 
of several ‘boiler-plate’ clauses, to be left to the care of their respective legal counsels, such as provisions dealing 
with force majeure, applicable law or notices.”). 
12 PHILIPPE FOUCHARD & BERTHOLD GOLDMAN, FOUCHARD GAILLARD GOLDMAN ON INTERNATIONAL COMMER-
CIAL ARBITRATION 263 (Emmanuel Gaillard & John Savage eds., 1999) (“If interpreted literally, these clauses 
would be ruled ineffective.”). 
13 LEW ET AL., supra note 1, at ¶¶ 7–75, (2003) (“While these clauses refer to non-existing institutions they show 
clearly that the parties intended to submit their disputes to arbitration.  For this reason, courts and tribunals are 
reluctant to consider these clauses void for uncertainty.”).  See also DAVID JOSEPH, JURISDICTION AND ARBITRA-
TION AGREEMENTS AND THEIR ENFORCEMENT ¶ 4.78 (3d ed., 2015) (“The court, however, will be very reluctant, 
except in an extreme case, to find that a dispute resolution agreement simply fails for uncertainty or unworkabil-
ity,” and references therein). 
14 Warnes S.A. v. Harvic Int’l, Ltd., 1993 WL 228028 (S.D.N.Y. June 22, 1993). 
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Therefore, it is relevant to look at the correlation between having the arbitration 
agreement set aside, because it is “inoperative or incapable of being performed”,15 and 
the lex arbitri default-mechanism for remedying a defective procedure. To the extent 
that the lex arbitri rules regulate where the arbitration procedure cannot proceed as 
agreed and thus enable the arbitration process to proceed in spite of the defect, it can 
inherently not generally be assumed that the arbitration agreement is inoperable with 
reference to same defect.  
It has been stated that the enforcement of arbitration agreements containing non-
existing or inaccessible elements may imply a risk of a later arbitration award being set 
aside, because the arbitration procedure “was not in accordance with the agreement of 
the parties”.16  However, the assumption seems to ignore that this is not a case of setting 
aside or amending an agreement between the parties, but of interpreting and supple-
menting an unclear/defective procedure using the gap-filling rules.  The purpose and the 
considerations behind the New York Convention and the UNCITRAL Model Law do 
not support that “the agreement of the parties”17 be interpreted narrowly as a reference 
to the exact wording of the agreement—with the result that many arbitration agreements 
must be set aside as inoperable.  
In accordance with this, Lucky Goldstar states that the possibility that inaccessibil-
ity may imply that the arbitration agreement is “incapable of being performed”: “would 
only apply if the curial law of the state where the arbitration was taking place had no 
provision equivalent to ss. 9 and 12 of the [Hong Kong] Arbitration Ordinance and 
Article 11 of the Model Law.”18  Further Born states: “[The UNCITRAL Model Law] 
Article 11(4) also impliedly confirms that an arbitration agreement may generally re-
main valid and binding, notwithstanding the failure of the parties’ agreed mechanism 
for appointing the arbitrator(s).”19  See also KVC Rice: “[I]n a case to which either s 13 
of the [SG]AA or Art 11(3) of the Model Law applies, the absence of provisions con-
cerning the establishment of the arbitral tribunal would not pose significant difficulties 
because the parties can invoke the statutory mechanisms […] to make the necessary 
appointments.”20 
                                                      
15 U.N. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards art. II(3), June 10, 1958, 21 
U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 38 [hereinafter New York Convention]; U.N. Commission on International Trade Law, 
Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, Art. 8(1), U.N. Doc A/40/17, Annex I (June 21, 1985) [here-
inafter UNCITRAL Model Law]. 
16 Milo Molfa, Pathological Arbitration Clauses and the Conflict of Laws, 37 H.K. L.J. 161, 181–82, and n. 75–76 
(2007) (“The risk of being too eager in rescuing arbitration clauses containing an inaccurate reference to an arbitral 
institution would be to trigger the application of Art V(1)(d) [NYC] when the enforcement of the award is sought”).  
17 New York Convention, supra note 15, at art. V(1)(d); UNCITRAL Model Law, supra note 15, at art. 
36(1)(a)(iv). 
18 Lucky-Goldstar Int’l (H.K.) Ltd. v. Ng Moo Kee Eng’g Ltd., [1993] 1 H.K.C. 404, 407 (H.K.) (emphasis added). 
19 BORN, supra note 11, at 1715. 
20 K.V.C. Rice Intertrade Co. Ltd. v. Asian Mineral Res. Pte. Ltd. [2017] SGHC 32, ¶ 30. 
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Conversely, the possibility that the arbitration agreement may lapse due to patho-
logical procedural rules is not precluded under the New York Convention, the UN-
CITRAL Model Law, or the typical lex arbitri.21 
In the following, I will initially present the terminological and analytical framework 
for handling pathological arbitration agreements (Part II).  Against this background, I 
will analyse case law from USA (Part III), Singapore and Hong Kong (Part IV), and 
England (Part V) in order to establish under which circumstances Solution 1, Solution 2 
and Solution 3 apply in respect of arbitration agreements containing non-existing and 
inaccessible elements.  Finally, Part VI considers an adjoining—although fundamental-
ly different—interpretation situation across jurisdictions.  Part VII provides a summary 
as well as concluding remarks on the drafting of arbitration agreements.  
 
II. THE PATHOLOGY CONCEPT AND THE COMPONENTS OF THE ARBITRATION 
AGREEMENT 
 
The arbitration law expression “pathological arbitration agreement” is ascribed to 
the Frenchman Frédéric Eisemann’s iconic article La clause d’arbitrage pathologique 
from 1974.22  Eisemann is a former secretary general of the ICC’s International Court 
of Arbitration, and the article provides—in Eisemann’s own words—insight into the 
musée noir of arbitration law and presents the most characteristic perles, which Eise-
mann encountered in ICC context.23  According to Eisemann, an arbitration agreement 
is pathological if—due to its drafting—it does not support one or more of the arbitration 
agreement’s four essential functions.24 
Eisemann places pathological arbitration agreements into two main categories: (A) 
Arbitration agreements that—even though they do not directly contradict the essential 
                                                      
21 See also ALBERT JAN VAN DEN BERG, THE NEW YORK ARBITRATION CONVENTION OF 1958 159 (1981).  Re-
garding the question of “incapable of being performed” under the New York Convention art. II(3), “[i]t would also 
apply to cases where the arbitrator named in the agreement refuses to accept his nomination, or the appointing 
authority designated in the agreement refuses to make the appointment of the arbitrator.  Under the law applicable 
to the arbitration agreement, these cases may cause the termination of the arbitration agreement.”  
22 Frédéric Eisemann, La Clause d’arbitrage pathologique, in COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: ESSAYS IN MEMORIAM 
EUGENIO MINOLI 129–61 (1974).  As an example of the continuing practical relevance of Eisemann’s article, see, 
e.g. HKL Group Co. Ltd. v. Rizq Int’l Holding Pte. Ltd., [2013] SGHCR 5, ¶ 17–19.  
23 Eisemann, supra note 22, at 129. 
24 Id. at 130 (les fonctions essentielles de la clause d'arbitrage) (referenced by Benjamin G. Davis, Pathological 
Clauses: Frederic Eisemann’s Still Vital Criteria, 7 ARB. INT’L 365, 365–88 (Dec. 1991) (“(1) The first, which is 
common to all agreements, is to produce mandatory consequences for the parties, (2) The second, is to exclude the 
intervention of state courts in the settlement of the disputes, at least before the issuance of the award, (3) The third, 
is to give powers to the arbitrators to resolve the disputes likely to arise between the parties, (4) The fourth, is to 
permit the putting in place of a procedure leading under the best conditions of efficiency and rapidity to the render-
ing of an award that is susceptible of judicial enforcement.”)). 
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functions of the arbitration agreement—cause difficulties that must be overcome, and 
(B) arbitration agreements that do not fulfil one or more of the essential functions: 
Pathology group A (Les clauses pathologiques au 1er degré) consists of arbitration 
agreements that give rise to difficulties with respect to (a) appointment of arbitrators 
and (b) procedure and choice of law.25  This category includes arbitration agreements 
that set out ambiguous, inoperable, or incomplete requirements for the appointment of 
arbitrators or the procedure in general, including requirements that complicate the inter-
action with (ICC's) arbitration rules.26  This category also includes excessive levels of 
detail.27 
Pathology group B (Les clauses pathologiques au second degré) is subdivided into 
(a) arbitration agreements where the appointment of arbitrators requires a new agree-
ment or the intervention of the courts; (b) arbitration agreements where “dangerous” 
limits for the jurisdiction of the arbitration tribunal are set out; and (c) arbitration 
agreements that have been so poorly drafted that they cannot even be designated as 
arbitration agreements (les clauses hyperpathologiques).28 
Eisemann’s categorizations are not (any longer) operational for the pathologies 
most often seen in case law.29  The core of the pathology concept is that the arbitration 
agreement is born (agreed on) with an inherent disease (defect),30 i.e. that the agree-
ment is drafted in a way that from the time of entering into the agreement raises ques-
tions concerning its own interpretation,31 and hence is liable to disrupt the smooth pro-
gress of the arbitration.32 
                                                      
25 Eisemann, supra note 22, at 132. 
26 Id. 
27 Id. 
28 Id. at 149. 
29 See Davis, supra note 24.  
30 Defect or defective is often used as an alternative or synonym for pathological.  See e.g. BLACKABY, ET AL., 
supra note 11, at ¶ 2.197; Derek P. Auchie, The Liberal Interpretation of Defective Arbitration Clauses in Interna-
tional Commercial Contracts: A Sensible Approach?, 10 INT’L ARB. L. REV. 206 (2007); Clive M. Schmitthoff, 
Defective Arbitration Clauses, J. BUS. L. 9 (1975). 
31 James Spigelman, The Centrality of Contractual Interpretation: A Comparative Perspective, 81 ARB. 234, 246 
(2015) (“contain verbal and grammatical errors which require interpretation.”);  BORN, supra note 11, at 771 (“par-
ties frequently agree to less detailed – and sometimes much more confused – arbitration clauses.”);  PAULSSON, ET 
AL., supra note 1, at 127 n. 1 (“mistakes in drafting arbitration agreements and clauses, not with fraud.”); Marie-
Helene Maleville, “Pathological" Arbitration Clauses, 1 INT’L BUS. L. J. 61, 61–83 (2000), (“the ambiguity or 
imprecision of [arbitration] clauses.”); Dorothee Schramm, Elliott Geisinger & Philippe Pinsolle, Article II, in 
RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN ARBITRAL AWARDS: A GLOBAL COMMENTARY ON THE NEW 
YORK CONVENTION 37, 58 (Herbert Kronke et al. eds., 2010) (“poorly drafted agreements that are incomplete, 
unclear, or contradictory, and thus lead to confusion as to the parties intent.”).  
32 Compare FOUCHARD & GOLDMAN, supra note 12, at 261–262 (“[C]ontain a defect or defects liable to disrupt the 
smooth progress of the arbitration.”), with Molfa, supra note 16, at 162, and ANDREA M. STEINGRUBER, CONSENT 
IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION ¶ 7.46 (Loukas Mistelis ed., 2012).  See Duarte G. Henriques, Pathological 
Arbitration Clauses, Good Faith and the Protection of Legitimate Expectations, 31 ARB. INT’L 349, 354 (June 
2015) (“[C]ontains a defect or defects liable to disrupt the smooth progress of the arbitration”); STEFAN LINDSKOG, 
SKILJEFÖRFARANDE: EN KOMMENTAR 117 (2d ed., 2012) (roughly stating “an arbitration agreement that for vari-
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From this, three delimitations follow: 
First, the pathology concept presumes the existence of a valid agreement.  Tradi-
tional questions of existence and validity, among others, fall outside the concept.33 
Second, the pathology concept is not delimited to agreements, which cannot be en-
forced, i.e. instances where the disease is incurable and thus fatal for the arbitration 
agreement.34  Such (narrow) perception is not expedient, since the pathology concept in 
this case obtains a prescriptive content, which presumes a preceding procedure.  The 
value of the concept lies in describing an inherent state of the arbitration agreement.  
Whether (and how) this state is "curable" does not change the original "sickliness".  See 
also Singapore Court of Appeal: 
Calling the Arbitration Agreement ‘pathological’ does not, of course, change its le-
gal character or its substance.  [...]A defect in an arbitration clause does not necessarily 
negate the agreement thereby constituted.  It depends on the nature or the substance of 
the defect, or whether the defect is curable.  The concept of a pathological clause fulfils 
a descriptive function rather than a prescriptive function and labelling or describing a 
clause as ‘pathological’ does not automatically invalidate it as an agreement.35 
Third, the concept solely includes issues in the agreement, which can be ascertained 
from the beginning, i.e. already on the basis of the wording of the arbitration clause.36   
The question of interpreting the scope of the arbitration agreement thus falls out-
side the pathology concept.  The scope of the arbitration agreement concerns which 
disputes the agreement includes, i.e. the wording of the scope may cause difficulties 
with respect to delimiting the arbitration tribunal's jurisdiction.37 However, these diffi-
culties arise in light of the substantive disputes and claims between the parties that arise 
later and thus are not an expression of an inherent disease that can be ascertained at the 
time of entering the agreement.38 
                                                                                                                                          
ous reasons does not work,”).  See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE U.S. LAW OF INTERNATIONAL COMMER-
CIAL ARBITRATION § 2-16, reporters’ note (a) (AM. LAW INST., Tentative Draft No. 4, 2015) (“[A]greements 
drafted in such a way that, rather than providing for speedy resolution of the underlying dispute, they inadvertently 
generate disputes as to their own interpretation and may even cause the arbitration agreement to be denied en-
forcement altogether.”). 
33 See in this regard UNCITRAL, UNICTRAL 2012 Digest of Case Law on the Model Law on International Com-
mercial Arbitration 38, U.N. Sales No. E.12.V.9, https://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/clout/MAL-digest-2012-
e.pdf (“[T]he problem relates not to the existence or validity of the respondent’s consent to contractual terms, but 
rather to whether those terms express an intention to resort to final and binding arbitration.”). 
34 See Henriques, supra note 32 (“irrespective of the fact that such defect renders it impossible to proceed with the 
arbitration.”).   
35 Insigma Tech. Co. Ltd. v. Alstom Tech. Ltd. [2009] SGCA 24, ¶ 37–38, and references therein. See also HKL 
Group Co. Ltd. v. Rizq Int’l Holding Pte. Ltd., [2013] SGHCR 5, ¶ 12 (“Whether that clause may or may not be 
upheld depends on the nature and extent of its pathology.”). 
 
36 Spigelman, supra note 31.  
37 Id. at 234–36. 
38 Id. at 240. 
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The arbitration agreement may analytically be divided into the following four (fo-
rensic) components:  
(I) A derogation agreement that takes away jurisdiction from the national courts to 
settle disputes.39 
 
(II) A prorogation agreement that bestows jurisdiction on an arbitration tribunal to 
settle disputes.40 
 
(III) Procedural rules, i.e. the (expressly or implictly) agreed terms in respect of the 
contents of the arbitration proceedings, including the choice of seat, appointment of 
arbitrators, administration, language, choice of law, etc.41  
 
 (IV) The scope of the arbitration agreement, i.e. the statement of which dis-
putes the agreement (components I and II) covers.42 
 
This division into components creates —together with the pathology concept—the 
basis for a functional system for identifying, analysing and comparing interpretative 
issues (and their solution) across jurisdictions. 
A forum agreement usually contains both derogating and prorogating elements.43  
Accordingly, components I and II will jointly be referred to as the “jurisdictional allo-
cation”, i.e. the obligation to settle disputes in an arbitration procedure instead of a 
litigation process.  Correspondingly, the derogation and prorogation agreements are 
rarely individually and separately described in the arbitration clause.44  If the provision 
indicates prorogation, e.g. “disputes shall be referred to and finally resolved by arbitra-
tion”, it is normally unnecessary to indicate the derogation separately: Opting in arbitra-
tion implies the corresponding opting out of litigation.45  
In principle, nothing prevents the parties from limiting the arbitration agreement’s 
derogating or prorogating effects in various ways, e.g. via time limits, right of choice or 
observing a preceeding procedure.46  However, it makes no sense in a meaningful way 
to talk about an “arbitration agreement”, which is solely derogating (let alone solely 
                                                      
39 Julian D. M. Lew, Does National Court Involvement Undermine the International Arbitration Processes?, 24 
AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 489, 491 (2009). 
40 Id. 
41 Robert Donald Fischer & Roger S. Haydock, International Commercial Disputes Drafting an Enforceable Arbi-
tration Agreement, 21 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 941, 963 (1996). 
42 Id. 
43 Ingrid M. Farquharson, Choice of Forum Clauses – A Brief Survey of Anglo-American Law, 8 INT’L L. 83, 86 
(1974). 
44 Tiong Min Yeo, The Contractual Basis of the Enforcement of Exclusive and Non-Exclusive Choice of Court 
Agreements, 17 SING. ACAD. L.J. 306, 312–14 (2005).   
45 See New York Convention, supra note 15, at art. II; UNCITRAL Model Law, supra note 15, at art. 5, 8. 
46 Michael Pryles, Limits to Party Autonomy in Arbitral Procedure, 24 J. INT’L ARB. 327, 327–30 (2007). 
9
Frank: Interpretation of Pathological Arbitration Agreements
Published by Pepperdine Digital Commons, 2020




prorogating).  A forum agreement that opts out litigation, but not at the same time opts 
in arbitration (to some extent), is not an “arbitration agreement” in the sense of the New 
York Convention and the UNCITRAL Model Law.47  However, the arbitration agree-
ment’s practical value is closely connected to the derogating effect: If the courts do not 
recognize and respect the opt-out – typically in connection with considering the defend-
ant’s motion for dismissal (or request to stay court proceedings) with reference to the 
arbitration agreement – the opt-in in reality fades in importance.48 
The question about interpretation of arbitration agreements may arise at different 
stages of the arbitration process: (i) the arbitration tribunal’s ruling on its own jurisdic-
tion;49 (ii) the courts’ review of the decision of the arbitration tribunal in respect of its 
own jurisdiction;50 (iii) the courts’ decision on the defendant’s motion for dismissal;51 
and (iv) the courts’ consideration of setting aside or enforcement of the arbitration 
award.52 
In order to obtain a sufficiently nuanced analysis, the interpretation must be seen in 
relation to the individual components of the arbitration agreement.  The arbitration 
agreement may thus contain a pathological component, e.g. pathological procedural 
rules (component III), which seen in isolation may be “curable” or “incurable”.53  True 
to the pathology terminology, the relation between the different components may be 
described using “infection” terminology: If, for instance, a pathological and incurable 
procedural rule implies that the derogation and prorogation agreement is unenforceable 
(i.e. that the pathology becomes fatal for the arbitration agreement as such), the proce-
dural rule has “infected” the derogation and prorogation agreement.  If, however, the 
pathological element is “curable” (and is therefore not “infectious”), the arbitration 
agreement as such may also be considered as “cured” (or “rescued”). 
The arbitration clause will (but not always) contain explicit indications of compo-
nent IV (scope), which is typically the first part of the arbitration clause, and component 
III (procedural rules), which are typically the last part of the arbitration clause.54  As a 
rule, the derogation agreement (component I) is implied.55  The contents and the inter-
action between the components may be illustrated by SIAC’s model clause:  
[Component IV:] Any dispute arising out of or in connection with this contract, in-
cluding any question regarding its existence, validity or termination, [component II (and 
I):] shall be referred to and finally resolved by arbitration [Component III:] adminis-
                                                      
47 New York Convention, supra note 15; UNCITRAL Model Law, supra note 15, at art. 5, 8. 
48 YEO, supra note 44. 
49 UNCITRAL Model Law, supra note 15, at art. 16(1). 
50 Id. at art. 16(3). 
51 Id. at art. 8. 
52 Id. at art. 34, 36. 
53 Spigelman, supra note 31. 
54 Fischer & Haydock, supra note 41. 
55 Yeo, supra note 44. 
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tered by the Singapore International Arbitration Centre (‘SIAC’) in accordance with the 
Arbitration Rules of the Singapore International Arbitration Centre (‘SIAC Rules’) for 
the time being in force, which rules are deemed to be incorporated by reference in this 
clause.56 
Components I, II and III are general themes in the pathology dealt with in this arti-
cle. 
 
III. US AMERICAN LAW 
 
A. The Default Mechanism 
 
Arbitration agreements referring to non-existing and inaccessible elements are not a 
new phenomenon in US American law, but they are primarily experienced in an inter-
national context.57  The pathology concept makes FAA Section five (which has existed 
since 1925 and is the FAA’s counterpart to the UNCITRAL Model Law Article 11(c)) 
relevant to the court’s jurisdiction in assisting in the appointment process: 
If in the agreement provision be made for a method of naming or appointing an ar-
bitrator or arbitrators or an umpire, such method shall be followed; but if no method be 
provided therein, or if a method be provided and any party thereto shall fail to avail 
himself of such method, or if for any other reason there shall be a lapse in the naming 
of an arbitrator or arbitrators or umpire, or in filling a vacancy, then upon the applica-
tion of either party to the controversy the court shall designate and appoint an arbitra-
tor or arbitrators or umpire, as the case may require.58 
The US American default mechanism thus provides the courts with a broad (“for 
any other reason”) obligation (“shall”) upon application to appoint the members of the 
arbitration tribunal.  The provision is interpreted broadly,59 and hardly provides the 
basis for making a distinction between an institution ceasing to exist before or after the 
conclusion of the agreement.60 
 
                                                      
56 SIAC Model Clause, SIAC (Sept. 2018), http://www.siac.org.sg/model-clauses/siac-model-clause. 
 
57 See Christopher J. Karacic & Howard S. Suskin, When the Arbitration Forum is Unavailable: What Happens 
Next?, AM. B. ASS’N (Aug. 9, 2017), 
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/litigation/committees/jiop/articles/2014/when-arbitration-forum-is-
unavailable-what-happens-next/. 
58 9 U.S.C. § 5 (1947) (emphasis added). 
59 Khan v. Dell Inc., 669 F.3d 350, 356 (3d Cir. 2012) (“To take a narrower construction of Section 5 would be 
inconsistent with the ‘liberal federal policy in favor of arbitration’ articulated in the FAA.”). 
60 Stinson v. America’s. Home Place, Inc., 108 F. Supp. 2d 1278, 1285 (M.D. Ala. 2000) (stating that “this distinc-
tion is immaterial” as it relates to the “for any other reason” provision of section five of the Federal Arbitration 
Act).  
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B. The Intention of the Parties 
 
In an early ruling of the New York Supreme Court, Lab. Grossman,61 which still 
plays a role in case law, a Mexican and an American business had agreed on arbitration 
“in accordance with the rules and procedures of the Pan-American Arbitration Associa-
tion”, which, however, did not exist. 62  The American party claimed that the parties’ 
real intention was to refer to “the Inter-American Commercial Arbitration Commis-
sion”—an organization set up by the Pan-American Union — which the Mexican party 
contested.63  The court in New York did not settle the specific interpretation dispute, 64 
but in general stated: 
If it should be found that the parties really intended to arbitrate pursuant to the rules 
of the Inter-American Commercial Arbitration Commission [(as stated by the American 
party)], then arbitration before that tribunal should be directed, and nothing further need 
be determined. If, however, it should be determined that the parties did not so agree, the 
issue to be decided is whether the dominant purpose of the agreement was to settle 
disputes by arbitration, rather than the instrumentality through which arbitration 
should be effected. […] In such event, there being no viable organization named in the 
agreement, through which arbitration may be had, the court may direct arbitration be-
fore such tribunal as it may determine would be the most appropriate in the circum-
stances. (emphasis added)65 
Therefore, the essence according to Lab. Grossman is to assess whether the agree-
ment’s dominant purpose was (i) the jurisdictional allocation (“to settle disputes by 
arbitration”) rather than (ii) the procedural rule (“the instrumentality”).  In the former 
situation, the jurisdictional allocation is enforced, and the procedural rule is supple-
mented in the “most appropriate” way by the courts, while in the latter situation the 
arbitration agreement lapses.66  However, this does not apply if it can be established that 
                                                      
61 Laboratorios Grossman, S.A. v. Forest Labs., Inc., 295 N.Y.S.2d 756, 757 (N.Y. App. Div. 1968). 
 
62 See In re HZI Research Ctr. v. Sun Instruments Japan Co., 1995 WL 562181 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 20, 1995);  Lucky-
Goldstar Int’l (H.K.) Ltd. v. Ng Moo Kee Eng’g Ltd., [1993] 1 H.K.C. 404, 404 (H.K.).  Both of which are further 
described and discussed in the following.  
63 Laboratorios Grossman, 295 N.Y.S.2d at 575 (“The appellant denies that such was the agreement, and states 
further that the agreement to arbitrate was conditioned upon arbitration being conducted in Mexico.”). 
64 Id. (The court merely concludes that “in the light of these conflicting positions a hearing should be had to deter-
mine the true intent of the parties”). 
65 Id. 
66 Id.  Although the court does not explicitly refer to the lapse of the arbitration agreement, this is to be implied.  
See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE U.S. LAW OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION § 2-17, report-
ers’ note (a)(i) (AM. LAW INST., Tentative Draft No. 4, 2015) (“when it appears that the parties’ dominant intention 
was to arbitrate before a specific arbitral institution or arbitrator, courts will not sever the failed term from the rest 
of the agreement and the entire arbitration provision will fail”, and references therein). 
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the parties’ real intention was to refer to an existing element, because the arbitration 
agreement will in such case be construed accordingly.67 
In light of the initially described solution models (see Part II above), the approach 
in Lab. Grossman is clear and indeed quite operational: Solution 1 takes precedence if 
there is a specific, interpretative basis for it.68  Otherwise, Solution 2 is applied if the 
arbitration agreement’s dominant purpose must be assumed to be dispute resolution by 
arbitration.69  Only where the impracticable (pathological) procedural rule is not merely 
secondary, but is an integral part of the dominant purpose of the agreement will the 
result be Solution 3 (i.e. that the jurisdictional allocation is “infected” and the arbitra-
tion agreement lapses). 
As for the “dominant purpose” criteria’s origin, Lab. Grossman refers to Golen-
bock,70 which again refers to Marchant.71  The court in New York held that: 
There was no agreement here to arbitrate before particular arbitrators. The domi-
nant intent was to arbitrate, with the machinery of selection of the arbitrators subordi-
nate and incidental. The court in its discretion may appoint arbitrators from the former 
panel used by the New York Building Congress, Inc., at the time it engaged in arbitra-
tion. (emphasis added)72 
The dominant purpose approach is reiterated in HZI Researchs 73 where an Ameri-
can developer of medical equipment and a Japanese distributor had agreed on the fol-
lowing in terms of dispute resolution: “each party shall select an arbitrator and the two 
arbitrators shall select a third arbitrator, all of whom shall be Members of the American 
or Japanese Arbitrator Society, who will resolve the dispute.”  As opposed to the 
“American Arbitration Association” (AAA) and the “Japan Commercial Arbitration 
Association” (JCAA), the two named societies did not exist.  The American party 
                                                      
67 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE U.S. LAW OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION § 2-17, reporters’ 
note (a)(i) (AM. LAW INST., Tentative Draft No. 4, 2015). 
68 See Laboratorios Grossman, 295 N.Y.S.2d 756. 
69 Id. at 575. 
70 Golenbock v. Komoroff, 2 A.D.2d 742, 742 (N.Y. App. Div. 1956) (Botein, J., dissenting) (emphasis added) 
(“[I]n agreements where an intention to arbitrate is clearly paramount and the method of choice or the identity of 
the arbitrator is incidental or implemental, the courts will . . . designate a substitute arbitrator so that the intention 
of the parties can be effectuated.  That section should not be invoked, however, to frustrate the basic intention 
where the identity of the arbitrator agreed upon is a vital provision of the contract.”). 
71 Marchant v. Mead-Morrison Mfg. Co., 252 N.Y. 284, 295 (N.Y. 1929) (“There may be a dominant intention to 
arbitrate at all events, the machinery of selection being merely modal and subordinate.  If so, the failure of the 
means will not involve as a consequence the frustration of the end. . . . On the other hand, the promise to arbitrate 
may be so wedded to the means that the failure of the one will be the destruction of the other.”); see also Delma 
Eng’g Corp. v. K & L Constr. Co., 174 N.Y.S.2d 620, 621 (N.Y. 1958) (two (apparently American) businesses had 
agreed on arbitration “in accordance with the rules of the New York Building Congress, Inc.”, which, however, 
dismissed the case). 
72 Marchant, 252 N.Y. at 295. 
73 In re HZI Research Ctr. v. Sun Instrument Japan Co., 1995 WL 562181, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 20, 1995). 
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claimed institutional arbitration under the AAA, which the Japanese party contested.74  
The US American court, which initially referred to the federal policy,75 held that the 
reference to non-existing institutions 
 [F]urnishes no impediment to enforcement of the arbitration agreement. The domi-
nant purpose of the parties, clearly expressed in their contract, was to resolve disputes 
by arbitration. If the parties imperfectly or incorrectly designate the instrumentality 
through which arbitration should be effected, the court will enforce the contract by 
making an appropriate designation. (emphasis added)76  
The parties were subsequently referred to AAA.77  
HZI Research thus enforces the jurisdictional allocation – in spite of two non-
existing elements – and supplements the procedural rule at its discretion (Solution 2), 
since the parties’ dominant purpose was “to resolve disputes by arbitration.”78   
In Astra Footwear a contract for the acquisition of shoes between a Yugoslav man-
ufacturer and an American distributor stated that “[f]or all claims of disputes […] is 
competent the arbitrage for export trade at the Federal Chamber of Commerce in Beo-
grad.  In the case that the buyer is accused, the Chamber of Commerce in New York is 
competent” (emphasis added). 79  The question was whether the reference to the non-
existing “Chamber of Commerce in New York” referred to (i) ICC in New York (as 
submitted by the Yugoslav seller) or (ii) New York Chamber of Commerce (NYCC) (as 
submitted by the American buyer).80  The buyer claimed that “the naming of NYCC 
was an integral part of the substantive rights bargained for”, and that the arbitration 
agreement had therefore lapsed, because NYCC prior to the conclusion of the agree-
ment had ceased its arbitration activities (in connection with the conversion to the New 
York Chamber of Commerce & Industry (NYCCI)). 81   The court agreed with the buyer 
that the parties “intended the New York Chamber of Commerce NYCC, and not the 
                                                      
74 Id. (“arguing that its Agreement with HZI did not state that any arbitration would be conducted by the AAA, nor 
that the arbitration would take place in New York.”). 
75 Id. at *3 (“Arbitration agreements, favored by public policy, are construed broadly and in accordance with com-
mon sense”). 
76 Id. (referencing Astra Footwear Indus. v. Harwyn Int’l Inc., 442 F. Supp. 907 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 11, 1978)).  See 
generally Laboratorios Grossman, S.A. v. Forest Labs., Inc., 295 N.Y.S.2d 756, 757 (N.Y. App. Div. 1968);  
Delma Eng’g Corp. v. K & L Constr. Co., 174 N.Y.S.2d 620, 621 (N.Y. 1958); Lucky-Goldstar Int’l (H.K.) Ltd. v. 
Ng Moo Kee Eng’g Ltd., [1993] 1 H.K.C. 404, 404 (H.K.). 
77 In re HZI Research Ctr., 1995 WL 562181, at *4 (“In the case at bar, the [AAA] is an entirely appropriate desig-
nation. I direct that the arbitration of disputes between the parties proceed before that body forthwith, subject to 
whatever procedural rules the AAA may think right.”).  
78 Id.  See also Astra Footwear, 442 F. Supp. at 908 where the same court some years earlier — based on a combi-
nation of Solution 1 and Solution 2 — denied that the arbitration agreement’s reference to a specific chamber of 
commerce, which prior to entering into the agreement had ceased its arbitration activities, was “an integral part of 
the substantive rights bargained for.”  
79 Astra Footwear, 442 F.Supp. at 908. 
80 Id. at 908–09. 
81 Id. 
14
Pepperdine Dispute Resolution Law Journal, Vol. 20, Iss. 3 [2020], Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/drlj/vol20/iss3/5




[ICC] which has an office in New York”,82 but did not find that NYCC’s non-existence 
was fatal for the jurisdictional allocation.  The court appointed (at the suggestion of the 
parties) the members of the arbitration tribunal in accordance with section 5 of the FAA 
(as requested by the Yugoslav seller).83  
The ‘primary/secondary’ distinction is also applied in the more recent ruling in 
Travelport, where a distribution agreement between Dutch and Nigerian parties indicat-
ed “arbitration in the United States in accordance with the UNCITRAL Arbitration 
rules in force at the date of reference. 84  The Appointing Authority shall be the United 
States Council of Arbitration and such appointment will be in accordance with its ‘Pro-
cedures for Arbitration.’” (emphasis added).85  The fact that the latter ‘Appointing Au-
thority’ does not exist did not “infect” the jurisdictional allocation:86  “The parties clear-
ly expressed their intention to resolve this dispute through arbitration in the Distribution 
Agreement.  This was the parties’ primary intention; the agreement as to the particular 
forum was secondary.  The Court may therefore designate a proper arbitral body.”87  
As opposed to HZI Research, to which Travelport refers, supplementing the proce-
dural rule was not necessary in Travelport, because the rules for the arbitration tribu-
nal’s appointment were already set out in the UNCITRAL rules, which are incorporated 
in the arbitration agreement.88  In other words, the arbitration agreement was “cured” by 
severing the secondary, pathological element.89 
As for the specific “dominant purpose” assessment, case law suggests that the arbi-
tration agreement’s dominant purpose is presumed to be dispute resolution by arbitra-
tion (and thus Solution 2), unless specific points exist to dispel such presumption; cf. in 
this respect also the federal policy in general and the default mechanism in the FAA, 
section 5, in particular.90  As distinctly expressed in Astra Footwear:  
                                                      
82 Id. at 910.  The Court referred to the fact that “even the [seller] when seeking arbitration applied first to the New 
York Chamber of Commerce and Industry.  In addition, the [ICC] when approached as an arbitrator also suggested 
that the parties try the New York Chamber of Commerce.” 
83 Id. at 910–11. 
84 Travelport Glob. Distrib. Sys. B.V. v. Bellview Airlines Ltd., 2012 WL 3925856, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 12, 
2012). 
85 Id. 
86 Id. at *5.  Initially, the court referred to inter alia “a strong federal policy favoring arbitration.”  Id. at *3.  
87 Id., at *5 (referencing In re HZI Research Ctr. v. Sun Instrument Japan Co., 1995 WL 562181, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. 
Sept. 20, 1995)). 
88 Travelport, 2012 WL 3925856, at *5 (“The Distribution Agreement is construed so as to mandate composition of 
an arbitral panel in accordance with these rules.”).  
89 See also Constitution Reins. Corp. v. Republic W. Ins. Co. 1999 WL 126462, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 10, 1999), 
where the arbitration agreement included in a reinsurance contract referred to the non-existing “Rules of Procedure 
of Excess/Primary–Reinsurance Arbitration Forum of the Insurance Arbitration Forums, Inc.,” but at the same time 
also stated that the existing “Insurance Arbitration Forums, Inc. [‛IAF’] shall appoint the arbitrators.”  Id.  The 
court found that “[g]iven that the arbitration clause expressly states that the IAF ‘shall appoint the arbitrators[,]’ it 
seems reasonable that this matter may be heard by arbitrators appointed by Arbitration Forums, Inc. and in accord-
ance with that organization’s rules of procedure.”  Id. at *2. 
90 Astra Footwear Indus. v. Harwyn Int’l, Inc., 442 F.Supp. 907, 910–11 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 11, 1978).  
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The Court finds that [FAA] § 5 was drafted to provide a solution to the problem 
caused when the arbitrator selected by the parties cannot or will not perform. In view of 
the federal policy to construe liberally arbitration clauses and to resolve doubts in favor 
of arbitration […], the Court concludes that it cannot ignore the plain language of 
[FAA] § 5, nor do the equities of the case warrant doing so. The Court thus agrees to 
appoint an arbitrator pursuant to [FAA] § 5.”91 
This is supported by Warnes,92 which is often emphasised in international arbitra-
tion literature.93  A sales contract between an Argentinian and an American business 
stated that disputes “shall be finally settled by arbitration in New York in accordance 
with the Commercial Arbitration Rules of the New York Commercial Arbitration Asso-
ciation.”  The “Association” in question did not exist, and so the Argentinian party 
demanded “AAA arbitration,” while the counterparty claimed that the arbitration was 
not binding.94  The court referred initially to the federal policy,95 and held that “an 
agreement on a non-existent arbitration forum is the equivalent of an agreement to arbi-
trate that does not specify a forum, because the parties had the intent to arbitrate, even 
in the absence of a properly designated forum.”96  Based on the arbitration agreement 
(which in reality is blank) left after severing the non-existing element, the parties were 
referred to the AAA.97 
It is stated that, with respect to Warnes, the non-existing element “was interpreted 
as meaning [AAA] in New York.”98  This explanation of the judgment (indicating Solu-
tion 1) is however too undifferentiated.  The method is that the non-existing element is 
disregarded, and subsequently the court – either via the FAA’s supplementary rules or 
discretionarily – designates a new forum (Solution 2).  
Correspondingly, Travelport and HZI Research merely emphasise the parties’ dom-
inant intention to arbitrate as “clearly expressed” in their contract.  In other words, par-
ties having incorporated a jurisdictional allocation in the contract are assumed to domi-
nantly intend dispute resolution by arbitration.  
As for specific interpretation elements, it can be emphasised that the Travelport ar-
bitration agreement clearly sets out (i) the dispute resolution form (“arbitration”), (ii) 
the place of arbitration (“in the United States”), and also (iii) an existing set of rules 
                                                      
91 Id. 
92 Warnes S.A. v. Harvic Int’l, Ltd., 1993 WL 228028 (S.D.N.Y. June 22, 1993). 
93 See e.g. BLACKABY ET AL., supra note 11, at ¶ 2.66; BORN, supra note 11, at 778; Boo, supra note 1, at 43; 
Gaillard, supra note 12, at 264. 
94 Warnes, 1993 WL 228028, at *2 (“the parties are not bound to arbitrate”). 
95 Id. (“a liberal federal policy favoring arbitration,”) cf. inter alia Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. 
Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24–25 (1983) (“Any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor 
of arbitration.”). 
96 Id. (emphasis added). 
97 Id. at *3. 
98  FOUCHARD & GOLDMAN, supra note 12, at 256 (emphasis added). 
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(“the UNCITRAL Arbitration rules”).99  Against this background it is, all other things 
being equal, difficult to fairly claim that the “fourth” and last part of the arbitration 
agreement —a non-existing appointing authority—was essential for the jurisdictional 
allocation.  
Concerning the HZI Research arbitration agreement, it can be emphasised that the 
non-existing institutions (“the American or Japanese Arbitrator Society”) were merely 
designated as a basis for identifying some degree of affiliation for the arbitrators, and 
thus were not—as is normally customary—assigned appointing (or other significant) 
powers in the arbitration process.100  
Overall, it does not appear as a separate element in the assessment whether or not 
the jurisdictional allocation is specifically worded as a separate part from the procedur-
al rule – as is e.g. the case in Travelport and Warnes, but not in e.g. HZI Research and 
Astra Footwear.101  The opposite would also suggest a (narrow) linguistic interpretation 
approach, for which there is no basis under US American arbitration law.  
 
C. Specifically, About Mutual Mistake Objections 
 
Arbitration agreements containing non-existing elements are from time to time at-
tacked based on the general contract law principles of common/mutual mistake.102  Ac-
cording to general US American and English principles on common/mutual mistake, an 
agreement may be null and void if the parties had a misapprehension/erroneous percep-
tion in respect of the actual circumstances on which the agreement was entered into.103  
However, the misapprehension must be material.104  
                                                      
99 Travelport Glob. Distrib. Sys. B.V. v. Bellview Airlines Ltd., 2012 WL 3925856, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 12, 
2012). 
100 In re HZI Research Ctr. v. Sun Instruments Japan Co., 1995 WL 562181, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 20, 1995) 
101 See Travelport, 2012 WL 3925856, at *2 (“[A]rbitration in the United States in accordance with the UNCIT-
RAL Arbitration rules in force at the date of reference. The Appointing Authority shall be the United States Coun-
cil of Arbitration and such appointment will be in accordance with its ‘Procedures for Arbitration.’”) (emphasis 
added); Warnes, 1993 WL 228028, at *1 (“[The outcome] shall be finally settled by arbitration in New York in 
accordance with the Commercial Arbitration Rules of the New York Commercial Arbitration Association.”); but 
see HZI Research, 1995 WL 562181, at *5 (“[E]ach party shall select an arbitrator and the two arbitrators shall 
select a third arbitrator, all of whom shall be Members of the American or Japanese Arbitrator Society, who will 
resolve the dispute.”); Astra Footwear Indus. v. Harwyn Int’l, Inc., 442 F.Supp. 907, 908 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 11, 1978) 
(“In the case that the buyer is accused, the Chamber of Commerce in New York is competent.”). 
102 JOSEPH CHITTY, CHITTY ON CONTRACTS (H.G. Beale ed., 32d ed. 2015). 
103 Concerning the concept of common mistake in English contract law, see id. at ¶ 6-001 and EDWIN PEEL, TREIT-
EL ON THE LAW OF CONTRACT ¶ 8-001 (14th ed., 2015).  As to the concept of mutual mistake in American law, see 
for example, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 152 (AM. LAW INST. 1981) and EDWARD A. FARNS-
WORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS ¶ 9.3 (3d ed., 2004). 
104 Chitty, supra note 102, at ¶ 6-015 (“so fundamental that it makes the ‘contractual adventure’ impossible, or 
makes performance essentially different to what the parties anticipated”); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS 
§ 152(1) (AM. LAW INST. 1981); and FARNSWORTH, supra note 103, at ¶ 9.3 (“has a material effect on the agreed 
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Under English contract law an agreement may as well be ineffective, if the agreed 
machinery fails.105  However, if the machinery is merely assessed to be “subsidiary and 
inessential,” the courts may substitute it and the defect will have no effect on the en-
forcement of the contract.106   
Occasionally, an impossibility of performance objection is raised as an alternative 
to mutual mistake, where the arbitration agreement refers to non-existing arbitration 
rules.  The objection has been flatly rejected by the US American courts,107 and will not 
be considered further in this article.  
Since there will typically be no basis for doubting the parties' good faith in respect 
of the non-existence (and thus the existence of misapprehension), the key issue in prac-
tice will be whether the misapprehension affects the entire arbitration agreement (par-
ticularly the jurisdictional allocation) or merely the non-existing element (the procedur-
al rule).  
In Control Screening,108 a purchase contract between an American seller and a Vi-
etnamese buyer stated that “disputes shall be settled at International Arbitration Center 
of European countries for claim in the suing party’s country under the rule of the Cen-
ter.”109  The Center in question did not exist.110  The Vietnamese party instigated arbi-
tration proceedings in Belgium, and subsequently the American party petitioned for 
arbitration in New Jersey, USA (so-called petition to compel arbitration) before the 
court in New Jersey.111  The Court of Appeal initially emphasized that the New York 
Convention’s “null and void” exception must be read narrowly,112 and that the reference 
to the non-existing institution was an expression of a mutual mistake.113  The court fur-
ther stated: 
Since the parties mistakenly designated an arbitration forum that does not exist, the 
forum selection provision of the arbitration agreement is “null and void” under [NYC] 
Article II(3). . . . Even though the forum selection portion of the arbitration clause is 
                                                                                                                                          
exchange of performances”); GLEN BANKS, NEW YORK CONTRACT LAW ¶ 6:6 (2006) (“The mistake must go to the 
foundation of the agreement.”). 
105 Chitty, supra note 102. 
106 PEEL, supra note 103, at ¶ 2-096; Chitty, supra note 102, at ¶ 2-138. 
107 Gar Energy & Assocs. v. Ivanhoe Energy Inc., No. 1:11–CV–00907 AWI JLT, 2011 WL 6780927, at *8 (E.D. 
Cal. Dec. 27, 2011) (“In order to be an excuse for nonperformance of a contract, the impossibility of performance 
must attach to the nature of the thing to be done and not to the inability of the obligor to do it. . . . Here, the ‘nature 
of the thing to be done’ is arbitration, and impossibility does not attach to the procedure by which the arbitration is 
accomplished.”).  
108 Control Screening LLC v. Tech. Application & Prod. Co., 687 F.3d 163, 166 (3d Cir. 2012). 
109 Id. 
110 Id. at 170. 
111 Id. 
112 Id. (“[T]he ‘null and void’ language [of NYC art. II(3)] must be read narrowly, for the signatory nations have 
jointly declared a general policy of enforceability of agreements to arbitrate.”). 
113 Id. (“[A] result that could have come about only through mistake”); see also Lucky-Goldstar Int’l (H.K.) Ltd. v. 
Ng Moo Kee Eng’g Ltd., [1993] 1 H.K.C. 404, 406 (H.K.). 
18
Pepperdine Dispute Resolution Law Journal, Vol. 20, Iss. 3 [2020], Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/drlj/vol20/iss3/5




‘null and void,’ there is sufficient indication elsewhere in the contract of the parties’ 
intent to arbitrate, meaning that the parties’ agreement to arbitrate remains in force. . . . 
Thus, we find that the invalid forum selection provision is severable from the rest of the 
arbitration agreement. Because the forum selection provision is ‘null and void’, the 
otherwise valid arbitration agreement is treated as if it does not select a forum. (empha-
sis added)114  
Accordingly, the court does not merely establish that misapprehension exists.  The 
decisive factor is whether there is sufficient indication that the parties intended a juris-
dictional allocation in spite of the inoperative procedural rule.115  In the opinion of the 
court, this was the case in Control Screening —cf. in this respect the specific wording 
of the provision, among others — and therefore the forum requirement is severable and 
the effectively blank arbitration agreement that remains after the severing is enforced in 
accordance with the FAA’s general rules (Solution 2), i.e. the court compels arbitration 
in its own district: New Jersey USA (FAA, section 4, cf. section 208).116 
Control Screening disregards the arbitration agreement’s reference to “in the suing 
party’s country” (based on a contextual interpretation).117  Alternatively, however, the 
arbitration agreement may be considered to distinguish between institution (“Interna-
tional Arbitration Center”) and seat (“in the suing party’s country”).  The consequence 
of disregarding the non-existing institution would then be that the seat of arbitration 
according to the remaining (floating) arbitration agreement will be either USA or Vi-
etnam (depending on which party is the claimant).118  
Another alternative approach would be to maintain the parties’ intention to arbitrate 
in Europe (“European countries,”) which is a “neutral” forum for the parties.119  How-
ever, maintaining such vague geographical designation has the immediate disadvantage 
that the court by compelling arbitration “in Europe” does not identify the place of arbi-
tration (and thus not the applicable lex arbitri).  The latter approach does not seem to be 
supported in case law.120  
                                                      
114 Control Screening, 687 F.3d at 170. 
115 Id.  
116 Id. (“[The arbitration clause] states that: ‘Decision of arbitration shall be final and binding [sic] both parties[,]’” 
and “provides that the losing party shall bear ‘[a]ll expenses in connection with the arbitration’. . . . Furthermore, 
both parties have expressed a willingness to arbitrate their dispute notwithstanding the uncertain meaning of the 
forum selection provision.”). 
117 Id.; see also Lucky-Goldstar Int’l (H.K.) Ltd., [1993] 1 H.K.C. at 404. 
118 See Control Screening, 687 F.3d at 169. 
119 Id. at 170 n. 5 (“[T]he parties apparently intended to arbitrate in Europe.”). 
120 See Rosgoscirc ex rel SOY/CPI P’ship v. Circus Show Corp., Nos. 92 Civ. 8498 (JSM), 93 Civ. 1304 (JSM), 
1993 WL 277333, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. July 16, 1993) (where “the International Arbitration in the Hague (the Nether-
lands)” is not considered as a designation of Holland as the seat).  See also Jain v. de Mere, 51 F.3d 686, 688 (7th 
Cir. 1995) (where a reference to “an arbitrary commission applying French laws” is not seen as a designation of 
France as the seat); discussions in Marc J. Goldstein, Where Shall Arbitration Be Compelled if the Agreement Is 
Unclear: Searching for a Better Solution, ARB. COMMENTARIES (Aug. 8, 2012),  
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Control Screening in its approach resembles the earlier ruling in Rosgoscirc to 
which Control Screening also refers.  In Rosgoscirc,121 an American and a Russian 
party had originally entered into an agreement to arbitrate before the “American Arbi-
tration Association in New York” (as part of a partnership in respect of the performance 
of “the Moscow Circus” in among other places the US), which the parties later changed 
to the non-existing “International Arbitration in the Hague (the Netherlands).”122  In 
connection with a specific dispute, the Russian party instigated AAA arbitration (cf. the 
original agreement), but the American party submitted that the arbitration should have 
its seat “at the International Bureau of the Permanent Court of Arbitration at The 
Hague, The Netherlands”, with reference to this being “the nearest arbitration associa-
tion in the region most recently agreed upon by the parties.”123  The parties agreed that 
the non-existing element was due to “a mutual mistake,” and against this background 
the court in short found that “[h]ence, the provision should be considered void under 
Article II(3) of the [NYC].”124  Since the forum requirement is therefore unenforcea-
ble,125 the court can solely compel arbitration in its own district (FAA, section 4, cf. 
section 208), and the parties are therefore compelled to AAA arbitration in New York 
(in compliance with the Russian party’s petition).126  
Thus, Rosgoscirc distinguishes—as in Control Screening—between the jurisdic-
tional allocation and the ineffective procedural rule and enforces and supplements the 
arbitration agreement in accordance with the FAA’s general rules on compelling arbi-
tration (Solution 2).127  In addition, the court in Gar Energy, with respect to the mutual 
mistake issue, finds that reference to the non-existing “Arbitration Rules of American 
                                                                                                                                          
http://arbblog.lexmarc.us/2012/08/where-shall-arbitration-be-compelled-if-the-agreement-is-unclear-searching-
for-a-better-solution/. 
121 Rosgoscirc, 1993 WL 277333, at *1. 
122 Id. at *1–2.  The change of forum was caused by a compromise where the parties agreed on “a neutral region.”  
Id.  
123 Id. at *3.  The litigation arose because the American party requested a stay of the arbitration which the Russian 
party had initiated in New York.  In response, the Russian party requested “compelling the arbitration already 
initiated at the AAA in New York."  The reasons behind the American party seeking arbitration in the Netherlands, 
rather than on their 'home turf', are not illuminated in the judgment.  Id. 
124 Id. at *4 (emphasis added). 
125 Although the judgment is not explicit in this regard, it is clear (cf. also the application of FAA's gap-filling 
rules) that Rosgo does not disregard the entire arbitration agreement, but merely the procedural rule on the "non-
existent forum."  Accordingly, the Court points out at the outset that “the [N.Y.] Convention’s ‘null and void’ 
exception is to be narrowly construed.”  Id. at *3–4, and the references therein. 
126 Id. at *4–5.  The court also carries out a (short) alternative analysis based on the “basic contract principles” 
(where as the above referenced is based on “federal arbitration law”) and reaches the same result: “the intent of the 
parties would best be approximated by designating the AAA rather than sending the parties to a ‘dark horse’ forum 
whose only link is its geographical proximity to a fictitious entity.  Alternatively, the fact that the amendment 
contained a mutual mistake regarding the designated forum means that there was no ‘meeting of the minds’ and 
that the amendment, or at least the provision changing the arbitration forum, is void; the previous agreement provi-
ding for arbitration at the AAA thus governs this dispute.”  Id. at *5–6. 
127 Control Screening LLC v. Technological Application & Production Co., 687 F.3d 163 (3d Cir. 2012). 
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Arbitration Society in Bakersfield, California”128 does not constitute an “integral part” 
of the arbitration agreement:129 
[T]he material portion of the agreement is the commitment to arbitrate the claims. 
There is no evidence the parties’ agreement to arbitrate depended on the use of the 
[non-existent] AAS’s rules, or that a material term of the arbitration agreement was the 
use of these rules. To the contrary, it is apparent that neither party has ever seen the 
rules of the [AAS] nor had any meaningful knowledge or contact with the AAS.130   
Correspondingly, in Kwasny,131 where the court—with an initial reference to the 
federal policy132—finds that the non-existing “appointing and administrating body” to 
which the arbitration agreement refers,133 following a specific (and rather comprehen-
sive) mutual mistake assessment, “is severable from, and does not render unenforceable, 
the parties’ broad and overarching agreement to arbitrate.”134  The court emphasizes the 
burden of proof,135 the broad wording and regulation of the provision in question,136 the 
                                                      
128 The arbitration agreement, contained in a Confidentiality Agreement associated with a consultancy arrangement 
between an American and a foreign company, had the following wording: “Any dispute […] shall be settled before 
a panel of three arbitrators, one selected by each of the Parties and the third by the arbitrators selected by the Par-
ties, in accordance with the Arbitration Rules of the American Arbitration Society in Bakersfield, California.”  See 
Gar Energy & Assocs. v. Ivanhoe Energy Inc., No. 1:11–CV–00907 AWI JLT, 2011 WL 6780927, at *2 (E.D. Cal. 
Dec. 27, 2011).  The parties agreed that the “Society” concerned had not existed since 1926, and there was no even 
clarity as to whether the institution in question had then had “Arbitration Rules.”  Id. at *8.  The defendant sought 
AAA arbitration, but the plaintiff submitted that the arbitration agreement was unenforceable.  Id. at *10.   
129 At the outset, the court refers to the federal policy as “‛[a]ny doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues 
should be resolved in favor of arbitration’” and that “‘there is a presumption of arbitrability’ and arbitration should 
only be denied when ‘it may be said with positive assurance that the arbitration clause is not susceptible of an 
interpretation that covers the asserted dispute.’”  See Gar Energy, 2011 WL 6780927, at *6 (citations omitted).  
 
130 See Gar Energy & Assocs., 2011 WL 6780927, at *9 (original emphasis).  Accordingly, the court establishes 
that each party designates one arbitrator who together designate the third arbitrator, and that the arbitration rules 
and venue are to be determined by the arbitration tribunal.  Id. at *10. 
131 Kwasny Co. v. Acrylicon Int’l Ltd., No. 09-13357, 2010 WL 2474788 (E.D. Mich. June 11, 2010). 
132 See Kwasny, 2011 WL 2474788, at *3 (“[T]he Court is guided by ordinary contract law principles, but ‘any 
doubts regarding arbitrability should be resolved in favor of arbitration.’” (citations omitted)). 
133 The arbitration agreement, which was contained in a license agreement between an American party and a UK 
based party with its place of business in Norway, stated that “Any controversy […] shall be finally settled by 
arbitration in accordance with [ICC Rules].  See Kwasny, 2011 WL 2474788, at *2. The appointing and administra-
ting body will be the English Centre for International Commercial Arbitration.”  Id.  The named “English Centre” 
did not exist. 
134 See Kwasny, 2011 WL 2474788, at *6. 
135 See id.  (“Defendant has failed to identify any basis for the Court to conclude that the parties’ mistaken reference 
to a non-existent arbitration body in their Agreement should be viewed as integral to, and not severable from, the 
parties’ expressly stated intent to arbitrate.”). 
136 See id.  (“This arbitration clause is quite broad, reflecting the parties’ shared intent to arbitrate any dispute 
‘relating to’ the Agreement, and it specifies a number of details about how this arbitration is to be conducted, 
including the rules governing the arbitration process, the forum for the arbitration proceedings, and the method for 
selecting arbitrators.”). 
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incorporation of (existing) arbitration rules,137 and the contract’s general severability 
provision and the parties’ actions after the dispute arose.138 
See also the principle in Great Earth,139 where it was established that “the arbitral 
forum selection clause” (which referred to “Nassau County, New York”) could not be 
enforced (due to fraudulent inducement), and the question arose “whether the agree-
ment to arbitrate all disputes was separate and severable from the forum selection 
clause.”140  Based on a specific assessment the Court of Appeal concluded that this was 
the case, and the parties were compelled to arbitrate in Michigan in accordance with 
FAA, section 4.141  Also in Vegter, where the court “severs and declares unenforceable” 
a specific seat for the arbitration (due to unconscionability), but enforces and supple-
ments the remaining arbitration agreement.142 
Even though the terminology varies, it is a general feature that the non-existing el-
ement is considered null and void (cf. the New York Convention, art. II(3)), but that the 
“incurable” procedural rule is severed—and thus does not “infect” the jurisdictional 
allocation (Solution 2)—if  the parties’ dominant purpose with the agreement was to 
arbitrate.143  If so, the remaining (blank) arbitration agreement is enforced, which gen-
erally implies compelling arbitration under the FAA.144  See also National Material,145 
                                                      
137 See id.  (“[T]he clause itself mitigates, to a significant extent, the parties' mistaken reference to a nonexistent 
administrative entity, by virtue of the parties’ stipulation to arbitrate in accordance with the [ICC Rules]. . . . These 
rules, in turn, expressly identify the International Court of Arbitration as ‘the arbitration body attached to the ICC’ 
that is responsible for administering the ICC rules . . .  thereby suggesting the identity of the agency the parties 
might have had in mind with their mistaken reference to the ‘English Centre for International Commercial Arbitra-
tion.’”)  The last-mentioned assumption is open to discussion because the explicit reference to an administering 
body other than the ICC Court, all other things being equal, indicates an intention of hybrid arbitration.  However, 
the issue of hybrid arbitration was not contested in the case.  Id.  The court also refers to other contractual 
provisions as well as the parties' behavior.  Id.  
138 See id. 
139 Great Earth Cos., Inc. v. Simons, 288 F.3d 878 (6th Cir. 2002). 
140 See id. at 890 (“This conclusion follows from the straightforward application of the ‘general rule of contract 
law,’ . . . that where provisions of a contract are rescinded due to fraudulent inducement, the failure of a distinct 
part of a contract does not void valid, severable provisions. . . . ‘Whether the agreement to arbitrate is entire or 
severable turns on the parties’ intent at the time the agreement was executed, as determined from the language of 
the contract and the surrounding circumstances.’”) (citations omitted).  
141 See id. at 890–92.  
142 Vegter v. Forecast Financial Corp., 2007 WL 4178947, at *5 (W.D. Mich. Nov. 20, 2007). 
143 Control Screening LLC v. Technological Application & Production Co., 687 F.3d 163, 170 (3d Cir. 2012) 
(needing “sufficient indication”); Gar Energy & Assocs. v. Ivanhoe Energy Inc., No. 1:11–CV–00907 AWI JLT, 
2011 WL 6780927, at *9 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 27, 2011) (“[T]he material portion of the agreement is the commitment to 
arbitrate the claims.”); Kwasny Co. v. Acrylicon Int’l Ltd., No. 09-13357, 2010 WL 2474788, at *6 (E.D. Mich. 
June 11, 2010) (finding “broad and overarching agreement to arbitrate any dispute”); Rosgoscirc ex rel SOY/CPI 
P’ship v. Circus Show Corp., Nos. 92 Civ. 8498 (JSM), 93 Civ. 1304 (JSM), 1993 WL 277333 (S.D.N.Y. July 16, 
1993). 
144 See Control Screening, 687 F.3d at 171; see Rosgoscirc, 1993 WL 277333, at *3.    
145 Nat’l Material Trading v. M/V Kaptan Cebi, No. C.A. 2:95-3673-23, 1997 WL 915000 (D.S.C. Mar. 13, 1997).  
Note, on the other hand, that the conclusion in Marks 3-Zet-Ernst Marks v. Presstek, Inc., 455 F.3d 7 (1st Cir. July 
11, 2006) is caused by procedural circumstances (finding “[h]ad Marks chosen a different strategy, a different 
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where the court declares the entire arbitration agreement null and void with reference to 
the fact that the court “can give no meaning to the arbitration terms”, and cannot “re-
write the contract”.146  The arbitration agreement (contained in an international sales 
contract) referred to the non-existing “Court of Arbitration at the Chamber of Com-
merce and Industry of Switzerland”.147  The approach in National Material does not 
comply with other (more recent or earlier) case law.148  Further, the decision may have 
been influenced by a consideration of avoiding dyfucation of the proceedings with sev-
eral parties from different countries.  
It does not appear as a decisive element in the mutual mistake assessment whether 
the jurisdictional allocation is specifically worded as a separate part from the patholog-
ical procedural rule, see e.g. the arbitration agreement in Control Screening.149  Even 
though certain decisions indicate a more thorough, specific assessment,150 there also in 
respect of the mutual mistake objections seems to a general presumption that the pa-
thology does not “infect” the jurisdictional allocation (Solution 2), see in this respect in 
particular Kwasny: “Defendant has failed to identify any basis for the Court to conclude 
that the parties’ mistaken reference to a non-existent arbitration body in their Agree-
ment should be viewed as integral to, and not severable from, the parties' expressly 
stated intent to arbitrate.”151  And in Gar Energy: “There is no evidence the parties’ 
agreement to arbitrate depended on the use of the [non-existing] rules, or that a material 
term of the arbitration agreement was the use of these rules.”152   
In conclusion it does not—with respect to the enforcement of the arbitration agree-
ment (Solution 2)—seem to be of any real importance if non-existing elements are chal-
lenged particularly on the basis of general contract law principles of mutual mistake 
(null and void).  A central feature for the existence of legally relevant misapprehension 
is an assessment of the misapprehension’s significance for the agreement,153 which is 
                                                                                                                                          
outcome may have been warranted.  But to allow Marks to avoid the consequences of its strategic decision would 
lead to delay and minipulation”). 
146 See Nat’l Material, 1997 WL 915000 , at *6 (“There is no mutual mistake of fact as alleged; it is simply a 
unilateral mistake of [seller].  That is to say, [seller] named a court of arbitration that simply does not exist. The 
court can give no meaning to the arbitration terms, so as to validate this clause. . . . This court has no authority to 
rewrite the contract . . . . If this court were to compel . . .  arbitration at the forum specified in the sales contract, the 
parties could not implement such an order because recourse cannot be had to a nonexisting forum.  Consequently, 
no meaningful effect may be given to this clause, and it is declared null and void.”). 
147 See Nat’l Material, 1997 WL 915000, at *6.  
148 See also BORN, supra note 11, at 780 (finding the court’s reasoning "unsatisfactorily”).  
149 See Control Screening, 687 F.3d at 167–71. 
150 See id. at 163; Kwasny Co. v. Acrylicon Int’l Ltd., No. 09-13357, 2010 WL 2474788, at *6 (E.D. Mich. June 11, 
2010). 
151 See Kwasny, 2010 WL 2474788, at *6.  
152 Gar Energy & Assocs. v. Ivanhoe Energy Inc., No. 1:11–CV–00907 AWI JLT, 2011 WL 6780927, at *9 (E.D. 
Cal. Dec. 27, 2011). 
153 Chitty, Chitty, supra note 102, at ¶ 6-015 (being “so fundamental that it makes the ‘contractual adventure’ 
impossible, or makes performance essentially different to what the parties anticipated”); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) 
OF CONTRACTS § 152(1) (AM. LAW INST. 1981); FARNSWORTH, supra note 103, at ¶ 9.3 (finding that apprehension 
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also expressed in arbitration case law.154  This corresponds to the dominant purpose 
assessment as expressed in the case law mentioned in Part III.B above. 
D. Specifically, About Inaccessibility 
 
The cases where the arbitration agreement refers to an institution or a person that 
exists (or has existed), but which due to other circumstances is inaccessible to the par-
ties differs from non–existing elements in that the inaccessibility to a greater extent may 
be the result of circumstances which occur after entering into the agreement.  The ques-
tion is whether this justifies a difference in approach and solution. Where non–existence 
can be viewed on the basis of general contract law principles of mistake (see Part III.C 
above), a parallel may in respect of inaccessibility be drawn to the general principles on 
impracticability of performance/frustration of purpose.  The essence in respect of the 
latter is whether the unforeseen circumstance has an effect on the agreement’s basic 
assumptions.155 
In Khan,156 the contract between Dell and an American consumer (Mr. Khan) stated 
that disputes should be settled “exclusively and finally by binding arbitration adminis-
tered by the National Arbitration Forum (NAF) under its Code of Procedure.”157  NAF 
was prohibited from administering consumer arbitration, and therefore the arbitration 
agreement was in Khan’s opinion “unenforceable.”  Kahn was unsuccessful.158  The 
Court of Appeals (the majority), which initially emphasized the federal policy,159 as 
well as the fact that FAA section 5 “provides a mechanism for substituting an arbitrator 
when the designated arbitrator is unavailable,”160 referred to the following standard:  
                                                                                                                                          
“has a material effect on the agreed exchange of performances”); BANKS, supra note 104, at ¶ 6:6 (“The mistake 
must go to the foundation of the agreement.”).  
154 See Gar Energy, 2011 WL 6780927, at *9 (“Only if the choice of forum is an integral part of the agreement to 
arbitrate, rather than an ancillary logistical concern will the failure of the chosen forum preclude arbitration”, and 
the references therein); and see Kwasny, 2010 WL 2474788, at *5 (finding that “a mutual mistake voids a contrac-
tual provision only if mistake is material – that is, if ‘the mistaken belief relates to a basic assumption of the parties 
upon which the contract is made, and which materially affects the agreed performances of the parties.’ . . . In the 
specific context of mistakes in arbitration clauses, the courts have framed the pertinent inquiry as whether the 
parties' overarching intent to arbitrate a dispute, as evidenced by the language of their arbitration agreement and 
any relevant surrounding circumstances, survives and is severable from a particular infirmity or ambiguity within 
this agreement”).  
155 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, §§ 261–62, 265–66 (AM. LAW INST. 1981). 
156 Khan v. Dell Inc., 669 F.3d 350 (3d Cir. 2012). 
157 Id. at 351.  The arbitration agreement was contained in Dell's “Terms and Conditions of Sale,” which Mr. Khan 
had accepted when purchasing a computer online.  Id.  The arbitration agreement is within the ambit of the FAA 
due to the fact that it concerns “interstate commerce” (FAA section 1).   Id.  Mr. Khan did not dispute that an 
arbitration agreement was concluded and as such valid.  Id.  The fact that a consumer is involved does not seem to 
matter to the court. 
158 Id. at 350. 
159 Id. at 354 (quoting Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983) (“The FAA 
reflects a ‘liberal federal policy favoring arbitration.’”). 
160 Id. 
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Only if the choice of forum is an integral part of the agreement to arbitrate, rather 
than an ancillary logistical concern, will the failure of the chosen forum preclude arbi-
tration.”  In other words, a court will decline to appoint a substitute arbitrator, as pro-
vided in the FAA [§ 5], only if the parties' choice of forum is “so central to the arbitra-
tion agreement that the unavailability of that arbitrator brings the agreement to an 
end.”  In this light, the parties must have unambiguously expressed their intent not to 
arbitrate their disputes in the event that the designated arbitral forum is unavailable. 
(emphasis added). 161  
 
The relation between the procedural rule and the jurisdictional allocation, which is 
a general issue in connection with non–existing elements (see Part III.B-III.C above), 
was thus also decisive in Khan (“integral part” vs. “ancillary logistical concern”).162  
Khan is also clear in respect of the strength of presumption: The jurisdictional alloca-
tion is only “infected” (Solution 3), if the parties unambiguously have expressed their 
intent not to arbitrate their disputes in the event of inaccessibility.163  The mere choice 
of forum is in this respect insufficient.  The ambiguity in respect of the consequence of 
inaccessibility is resolved to the advantage of the jurisdictional allocation and the 
court’s supplementing power under the FAA, section 5 (Solution 2).164 
Khan is one among a number of US American decisions on primarily consumer 
purchase contracts and employment contracts, where the arbitration agreement is af-
fected by an inaccessible element.165  Even though case law is not stringent, the majori-
ty support the approach in Khan.166   
                                                      
161 Id. (references, internal quotation marks, and square brackets omitted).   
162 Id. at 353–54. 
163 Id. at 354. 
164 Id. at 356 (“The language relied on by Khan is at best ambiguous as to whether the parties intended to have their 
disputes arbitrated in the event that NAF was unavailable for any reason.  Because of the ambiguity, it is not clear 
whether the designation of NAF is ancillary or is as important a consideration as the agreement to arbitrate itself.”).  
“Therefore, we must resolve this ambiguity in favor of arbitration.”  Id.  
165 See generally id. at 350. 
166 See id., inter alia, Zechman v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 742 F.Supp. 1359, 1364–65 (N.D. 
Ill. 1990) (“[C]ourts look to the ‘essence’ of the arbitration agreement; to the extent the court can infer that the 
essential term of the provision is the agreement to arbitrate, that agreement will be enforced despite the failure of 
one of the terms of the bargain.  If, on the other hand, it is clear that the failed term is not an ancillary logistical 
concern but rather is as important a consideration as the agreement to arbitrate itself, a court will not sever the 
failed term from the rest of the agreement and the entire arbitration provision will fail. . . . In cases where the failed 
term establishes the identity of the arbitrator or arbitrators, the [FAA § 5] steps in to cure the defect.”) (footnote 
omitted); Brown v. ITT Consumer Financial Corp., 211 F.3d 1217, 1222 (11th Cir. 2000)  (“Only if the choice of 
forum is an integral part of the agreement to arbitrate, rather than an ‘ancillary logistical concern’ will the failure of 
the chosen forum preclude arbitration.  Here there is no evidence that the choice of the NAF as the arbitration 
forum was an integral part of the agreement to arbitrate.”) (footnote omitted); Reddam v. KPMG LLP, 457 F.3d 
1054 (9th Cir. 2006); Adler v. Dell Inc., No. 08–cv–13170, 2009 WL 4580739, at *2 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 3, 2009) 
(“As a general rule, when the arbitrator named in the arbitration agreement cannot or will not arbitrate the dispute, 
the court does not void the arbitration agreement.  Instead, it appoints a different arbitrator, as provided in the 
[FAA section 5].  The exception to this rule occurs when ‘it is clear that the failed term is not an ancillary logistical 
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The approach of the US courts to inaccessible elements therefore in principle does 
not differ from the approach to non-existing elements.167  This is consistent with the 
fact that the courts’ supplementing authority, FAA, section 5, is the same in both situa-
tions and is driven by the same considerations, just as the situations in reality also are 
congruent: the procedural rule de facto cannot be carried through.168 
Also, there seems to be no fundamental difference in whether the arbitration 
agreement refers to a specific person as opposed to—as is generally the case—an insti-
tution.  See, Ballas:  
[A] proper construction of the contract is that the intention to arbitrate is the domi-
nant intention, the personality of the arbitrator being an auxiliary incident rather than 
the essence, and that frustration of that dominant intention is not to be permitted merely 
because the precise method of accomplishing that intent has become impossible . . . . 
(emphasis added).169 
Correspondingly Domke on Commercial Arbitration: “The unavailability of the ar-
bitrator named in the arbitration agreement does not demonstrate a lack of agreement by 
the parties or invalidate an arbitration clause.”170  Also Born where it is concluded: 
In effect, these courts (correctly) adopt a presumption that the parties’ fundamental 
agreement is to arbitrate and that, absent a contrary showing, their choice of a particular 
institution, arbitrator, or appointing authority is an ancillary component of that agree-
ment which, if inoperable, can be cured by the court or arbitral tribunal.171 
This approach is consistent with the fact that the arbitration agreement would oth-
erwise become a quite unpredictable affair; as it is inherently subject to significant un-
certainty whether a specific person has the time, wish for and opportunity to take on the 
assignment as arbitrator at an unforeseeable future date.  Such fundamental uncertainty 
cannot as a general rule be assumed to be intended between rational, commercial par-
ties.  On the contrary.  As a couple of earlier decisions from the New York Supreme 
Court point out, the parties must be familiar with the vicissitudes of life: “they agreed to 
arbitrate and named [Person X] as arbitrator, and they must be deemed to have known 
that the vicissitudes of life are such that he was apt to become unavailable as time 
moved on.”172 
                                                                                                                                          
concern but rather is as important a consideration as the agreement to arbitrate itself.’”) (footnote omitted); but see 
Gutfreund v. Weiner (In re Salomon Inc. Shareholders' Derivative Litig.), 68 F.3d 554 (2d Cir. 1995) (where Court 
of Appeal concluded that the FAA, section 5, does not apply in cases where the agreed forum rejects arbitration). 
167 See cases cited supra note 166. 
168 See cases cited supra note 166. 
169 Ballas v. Mann, 82 N.Y.S.2d 426 (N.Y.S. 1948); compare Delma Eng’g Corp. v. K & L Constr. Co., 174 
N.Y.S.2d 620, 621 (N.Y. 1958) (“There was no agreement here to arbitrate before particular arbitrators.”). 
170 MARTIN DOMKE, GABRIEL M. WILNER, & LARRY E. EDMONSON, DOMKE ON COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: 
THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 8 (3d ed. 2003). 
171  BORN, supra note 11, at 782. 
172 Ballas v. Mann, 82 N.Y.S.2d 426, 427–28 (N.Y.S. 1948). 
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It may be that in most agreements to arbitrate future differences the dominant intent 
of the parties is to arbitrate – preferably with the person or persons named in the agree-
ment, but to arbitrate in any event.  Parties who adopt an arbitration clause when enter-
ing into a venture or transaction that may breed future differences have woven the arbi-
tration concept into the very fabric of their venture right at the start of their dealings.  
They must be aware of the many contingencies that could arise over an indeterminate 
period of time to render the named arbitrator unavailable for service.  When parties are 
alerted by such an awareness it might not be unreasonable to hold that if they do not 
restrict the arbitration to the named arbitrator in clear and specific terms, they intend to 
proceed to arbitration at all events with some substitute.173 
If the parties really wish that the arbitration tribunal must consist of Person A and 
no one else—with the consequence that the jurisdictional allocation in the event of Per-
son A’s inaccessibility (regardless of the cause) lapses—the parties are free to agree on 
this.  But ambiguity is interpreted to the advantage of the jurisdictional allocation.  In 
this respect the New York Court of Appeals in 1929 noted: 
We assume in favor of the defendant that it is possible to phrase an arbitration 
clause with a method of selection so transparently essential as to leave no room whatev-
er for the process of construction.  This might be so, for illustration, if there were a 
promise to arbitrate through a named person, and no one else . . . Here, on the contrary, 
promise and intention are not so free from uncertainty that construction is impossible.  
In the forefront of the clause is the statement of the dominant purpose that controversies 
of a given order shall be settled by arbitration.  What follows may be figured, at least 
with a show of reason, as incidental and subsidiary.174 
 
IV. HONG KONG AND SINGAPORE 
 
A. The Default Mechanism 
 
The courts in Hong Kong and Singapore have contributed with a couple of 
(in)famous cases of enforcement of arbitration agreements containing non-existing 
elements.175  Both jurisdictions have incorporated the Model Law by reference, includ-
ing art.  11(4), concerning the courts’ authority to assist in the appointment process (see 
the Singapore International Arbitration Act at art. 8 and the Hong Kong Arbitration 
Ordinance at pages 13 and 24).176  Article 11(4)(c) of the Model Law sets out the fol-
lowing default mechanism to remedy a defective procedure: 
                                                      
173 Golenbock v. Komoroff, 2 A.D.2d 742, 743 (N.Y. App. Div. 1956). 
174 Marchant v. Mead-Morrison Mfg. Co., 252 N.Y. 284, 296–97 (N.Y. 1929); see also, Ballas, 82 N.Y.S.2d at 427 
(“The parties here did not agree to arbitrate through [Person X] and no one else.”). 
175 See generally Lucky-Goldstar Int’l (H.K.) Ltd. v. Ng Moo Kee Eng’g Ltd., [1993] 1 H.K.C. 404 (H.K.). 
176 See International Arbitration Act (Cap 143a, 2002 Rev Ed) s 8; Arbitration Ordinance, (2011) Cap. 609, 13, 24 
(H.K.). 
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Where, under an appointment procedure agreed upon by the parties, . . . a third par-
ty, including an institution, fails to perform any function entrusted to it under such pro-
cedure, any party may request the court . . . to take the necessary measure, unless the 
agreement on the appointment procedure provides other means for securing the ap-
pointment.177 
 
The consideration behind the default mechanism is to “cure” pathological appoint-
ment procedures and thus prevent unenforceability and unnecessary delays.178  The 
broad wording and purpose of the provisions imply that the background for the ineffec-
tive appointment is of secondary importance, just as it cannot be decisive which (defec-
tive) appointment procedure is initially agreed upon.179 
 
B. Hong Kong: Lucky-Goldstar 
 
One of the most widely discussed decisions concerning pathological arbitration 
agreements, Lucky-Goldstar International v. Ng Moo Ke Enginerring180 has been char-
acterized as an “extreme case”181 and as a “leading authority”182—presumably because 
the decision concerns (and enforces) an arbitration agreement with an ambiguous 
statement of both seat (“3rd Country”) and institution (non-existent) based on a straight 
out purpose-oriented interpretation. 
In Lucky-Goldstar the parties had agreed that “any dispute . . . shall be arbitrated in 
the 3rd Country . . . in accordance with the rules of procedure of the International 
Commercial Arbitration Association.” (emphasis added)183  However, the “Arbitration 
Association” referenced did not exist.  Therefore, the plaintiff wanted the arbitration 
agreement to be set aside with reference to the existence of a common mistake;184 alter-
                                                      
177 UNCITRAL Model Law, supra note 15, at art. 11(3)(c). 
178 Seventh Secretariat Note, Analytical Commentary on Draft Text (A/CN.9/264 (25 March 1985)), ¶ 4, reprinted 
in HOWARD M. & JOSEPH E. NEUHAUS, A GUIDE TO THE UNCITRAL MODEL LAW ON INTERNATIONAL COM-
MERCIAL ARBITRATION: LEGISLATIVE HISTORY AND COMMENTARY 381–83 (1989).  “Paragraph (4) describes 
three possible defects in typical appointment procedures and provides a cure thereof by allowing any party to 
request the Court . . . to take the necessary measure instead (i.e. instead of the ‘failing’ party, persons or authority . 
. .).  Assistance by this Court is provided in order to avoid any deadlock or undue delay in the appointment pro-
cess.” (emphasis added).  Id. 
179 UNCITRAL Model Law, supra note 15, at art. 11(3)(c), which generally concerns situations where an institu-
tion “fails to perform any function entrusted to it under such [appointment] procedure”. 
180 Lucky-Goldstar Int’l (H.K.) Ltd., [1993] 1 H.K.C. at 404–09. 
181 LEW ET AL., supra note 1, at ¶¶ 7–77. 
182  BORN, supra note 11, at 778. 
183 The arbitration agreement’s floating element (“3rd Country”) is not discussed in this article.  Lucky-Goldstar 
Int’l (H.K.) Ltd., [1993] 1 H.K.C. at 404–09. 
184 Id. at 406 (“He submitted that when the parties have agreed to undertake arbitration only in certain circumstanc-
es, and according to certain rules and those rules turn out to be non-existent, the consent to arbitration is therefore 
nullified.”). 
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natively, that the arbitration agreement was “incapable of being performed.”185  But the 
parties apparently did not argue that the reference was actually aimed at the ICC or 
another existing institution.186 
The court in Hong Kong dismissed the common mistake objection with reference to 
the parties’ clear intention to arbitrate disputes: 
It is perfectly clear that the parties, by this clause, intended to arbitrate any disputes 
that might arise under this contract.  This agreement is not nullified because they chose 
the rules of a non-existent organisation . . . . As there are no rules of this non-existent 
organization the arbitration has to be conducted under the law of the 3rd Country cho-
sen by the Plaintiff.187  
The view about incapability of performance did not win acceptance either, in light 
of the parties’ “clearly expressed” intention:   
I cannot see how it can be said that this arbitration clause is ‘inoperative or incapa-
ble of being performed’.  True, it is, that there will be no arbitration under the rules of 
the International Commercial Arbitration Association, but there will be an arbitration 
under the law of the place of arbitration chosen by the Plaintiffs and they have a very 
wide choice indeed . . . I believe that the correct approach in this case is to satisfy my-
self that the parties have clearly expressed the intention to arbitrate any dispute which 
may arise under this contract.  I am so satisfied . . . . As to the reference to the non-
existent arbitration institution and rules, I believe that the correct approach is simply to 
ignore it.  I can give no effect to it and I reject all reference to it so as to be able to give 
effect to the clear intention of the parties . . . . I fail to see how it can be argued that 
either party could have placed any importance on a non-existent set of rules. (emphasis 
added) 188   
The fate of the arbitration agreement is thus decided by the clear jurisdictional al-
location (“intention to arbitrate any dispute”), which the arbitration clause reflects, and 
not the pathological procedural rule contained in the clause.189  Based on the jurisdic-
tional allocation, the court severs the pathological and unworkable procedural rule and 
enforces the remaining part of the arbitration agreement (Solution 2).190  The court’s 
categorical reasons in a sense resemble Warnes v. Harvic Int’l, where a New York court 
found “an agreement on a non-existent arbitration forum is the equivalent of an agree-
ment to arbitrate which does not specify a forum: since the parties had the intent to 
arbitrate, even in the absence of a properly designated forum.” (emphasis added)191  
                                                      
185 UNCITRAL Model Law, supra note 15, at art. 8. 
186 Lucky-Goldstar Int’l (H.K.) Ltd., [1993] 1 H.K.C. at 406.  In this regard, the Court merely notes that “[n]o useful 
purpose can be served by speculating as to what was actually intended by the use of these words.”  Id. 
187 Id. 
188 Id. at 407–08. 
189 Id. 
190 See id.  
191 Warnes S.A. v. Harvic Int’l, Ltd., 1993 WL 228028, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. June 22, 1993).  
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See also Guangdong Agriculture Company Ltd. v. Conagra International (Far East) 
Ltd., [1993] 1 H.K.L.R. (H.C.) concerning an “arbitration” clause under which a dispute 
“can then be submitted to the chartered loss adjuster for arbitration. The arbitration 
shall take place in Hong Kong and shall be executed in accordance with the rules of 
Hong Kong and the decision made by the adjusters shall be accepted as final and bind-
ing.” (emphasis added).192  The plaintiff claimed, inter alia, that the provision was unen-
forceable, because it was unclear, who (“the chartered loss adjuster”), how many (“ad-
juster” vs. “adjusters”), and which rules (“the rules of Hong Kong”) the agreement re-
ferred to.193  The court dismissed the submissions with reference to the fact that “the 
parties plainly agreed to settle any dispute by arbitration . . . . Should the parties be 
unable to agree the precise number of arbitrators or the rules to be followed, the Model 
Law will assist them.”194 
The decisions are clearly based on a distinction between jurisdictional allocation, 
which is assumed to be the parties’ dominant intention with the arbitration agreement, 
and the procedural rules, which in relation to the jurisdictional allocation take on a sec-
ondary role—as is also characteristic for US approach.195  As in US American case law, 
Lucky-Goldstar leaves an option open that a non-existing element under the circum-
stances may be of decisive importance, and thus cause the arbitration agreement to lapse 
(Solution 3).196  But, the court notes (obiter dictum) with reference to the dominant 
purpose test in Lab. Grossman (N.Y.S. 1968), which the court finds “useful.” 
I have no doubt that the parties’ dominant intention was to settle disputes by arbi-
tration rather than the instrumentality through which arbitration was to be conducted. 
This is clear from the fact that the organization referred to was non-existent and further, 
unlike in the case cited, neither party deposed to intending any specific alternate arbitral 
institution.197 
As the court in Hong Kong indicates, it must inherently be difficult to substantiate 
that an element, which does not exist, and which the parties therefore cannot have had 
any meaningful knowledge of, was important to the parties.198  The presumption is that 
the parties had a fundamental intention to arbitrate disputes, and this intention is not 
“infected” by the non-existing element. 
Even though the arbitration agreements in Lucky-Goldstar and Guangdong Agricul-
ture are not initially supplemented by the courts (as is usual in US American case law), 
it is an essential point in the decisions that the arbitration agreements do not leave the 
                                                      
192 Guangdong Agriculture Company Ltd., [1993] 1 H.K.L.R. (H.C.). 
193 Id. at ¶ 5.  
194 Id. at ¶ 9. 
195 See supra Part III. 
196 Lucky-Goldstar Int’l (H.K.) Ltd. v. Ng Moo Kee Eng’g Ltd., [1993] 1 H.K.C. 404, 407–08 (H.K.). 
197 Id. at 409. 
198 See also Gar Energy & Assocs. v. Ivanhoe Energy Inc., No. 1:11–CV–00907 AWI JLT, 2011 WL 6780927, at 
*9 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 27, 2011) (“[I]t is apparent that neither party has ever seen the rules of the [AAS] nor had any 
meaningful knowledge or contact with the AAS.”). 
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parties in limbo, but actually provide a possibility for instigating an arbitration proce-
dure (Lucky-Goldstar), potentially with the assistance of the courts (Guangdong Agri-
culture).199 
 
C. Singapore: HKL Group and KVC Rice 
 
In the HKL Group cases200—which initially obtained its fame as the keeper of the 
hybrid arbitration agreement—international commercial parties had, as part of a con-
tract for the sale of sand from Cambodia to be delivered in Singapore agreed that “all 
dispute[s] . . . shall be settled by the Arbitration Committee at Singapore under the rules 
of The International Chamber of Commerce.”201  As opposed to the ICC rules, “the 
Arbitration Committee at Singapore” does not exist, and the court had to consider 
whether the arbitration agreement was therefore inoperable.202 
The Singapore High Court found that the courts will generally seek to uphold the 
parties’ intent to arbitrate (cf. the principle of “effective interpretation”).203  In the 
analysis, the court discusses case law from Germany and Hong Kong as well as 
international and comparative arbitration literature.204  Specifically, the High Court did 
not find that there was a basis for concluding that institutional arbitration had been 
agreed in the form of either ICC205 or SIAC,206 and continued: 
Nonetheless, in my view, the arbitration clause is operative and workable for the 
following reasons. First, it clearly evi[de]nces the intention of the parties to resolve any 
dispute by arbitration. Second, it provides for mandatory consequences in that if a dis-
                                                      
199 Lucky-Goldstar Int’l (H.K.) Ltd., [1993] 1 H.K.C. at 404–07 (“As there are no rules of this non-existent organi-
zation the arbitration has to be conducted under the law of the third Country chosen by the plaintiffs . . . . [T]here 
will be an arbitration under the law of the place of arbitration chosen by the plaintiffs and they have a very wide 
choice indeed.”); Guangdong Agriculture Company Ltd., [1993] 1 H.K.L.R.at 4 (“[T]he Model Law will assist 
them.”). 
200 In both cases, the decisions were made by an Assistant Registrar (“AR”), i.e. that the decisions are not formally 
binding for other courts.  HKL Group Co. Ltd. v. Rizq Int’l Holding Pte. Ltd., [2013] SGHCR 5; HKL Group Co. 
v. Rizq International Holding Pte. Ldt. [2013] SGHCR 8.   
201 HKL Group Co., [2013] SGHCR 5, ¶ 1. 
202 Id.  
203 Id. at ¶ 13 (“[T]he court generally seeks to give effect to that [pathological] clause, preferring an interpretation 
which does so over one which does not.”) (referencing Insigma Tech. Co. Ltd. v. Alstom Tech. Ltd. [2009] SGCA 
24, ¶ 15 (“[T]he overarching principle of effective interpretation”; “the broad aim is to keep the clause alive.”); and 
¶ 24 (“[G]ive primacy to the decision of the parties to arbitrate and will seek to resolve the various pathologies with 
the aid of the principle of effective interpretation.”)). 
204 HKL Group Co., [2013] SGHCR 5, ¶ 17.  
205 Id. at ¶ 26.  The court notes that if an ICC National Committee had existed in Singapore, “the reference to the 
ICC rules would then be strongly indicative of an ICC arbitration administered by the National Committee.”  It 
may seem obvious that the High Court's reference to the National Committee cannot be taken literally (since such a 
committee actually exists in Singapore), but as a reference to the fact that ICC was not or did not have a 'local 
arbitration institution' in Singapore.  
206 Id. (“[S]ince the SIAC does not ordinarily apply the ICC rules.”). 
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pute arises, the matter has to be referred to arbitration. Third, it states the place of the 
arbitration, namely, Singapore. Fourth, it provides that the arbitration is to be governed 
by a particular set of rules, namely, the ICC rules. (emphasis added) 207 
Since there is therefore no basis for applying Solution 1,208 the non-existing ele-
ment is severed from the arbitration agreement and it is left to the parties to find an 
existing institution (SIAC, ICC or a third institution), which will accept the administra-
tion of the arbitration proceedings on the remaining, agreed terms (Solution 2);209 i.e. 
the place of arbitration being Singapore and subject to the ICC rules.  If this proves not 
to be possible, it must be assumed that the parties may proceed according to the Model 
Law, art. 11(4) (cf. SIAA, art. 8) in order for the president of the SIAC Court to appoint 
the members of the arbitration tribunal.210  In this way, the parties were not left with an 
arbitration agreement, the operability of which was conditional upon a party’s consent 
or third party acceptance.211 
HKL Group thus upheld—as in the twenty years earlier Lucky-Goldstar—the juris-
dictional allocation and the operable part of the procedural rules.212  HKL Group attach-
es (as does Lucky-Goldstar) particular importance to giving affect to the arbitration 
agreement “as it stands,”213 and does not take the opportunity to make an (objectively) 
more effective choice for the parties.214  As opposed to Lucky-Goldstar, HKL Group 
finds, however, no reason to emphasize the “dominant intention” test.215   
Even though HKL Group leaves it unanswered whether a situation corresponding to 
the one in Lucky-Goldstar—where ambiguity existed about both the place of arbitration 
and the institution/rules—would have had the same outcome in Singapore, there is 
hardly any reason to doubt that this would in principle be the case:  
Although I leave open the question, as it is not before this court, of whether the 
Singapore courts will likewise uphold an arbitration clause where there is uncertainty as 
                                                      
207 Id. at ¶ 27.  
208 See also Jason Fry, HKL Group Ltd v. Rizq International Holdings Pte. and HKL Group Co. Ltd. v. Rizq 
International Holdings Pte Ltd., 30 J. INT'L ARB. 453, 456 (2013) (“[T]he court found that the clause referred to an 
unidentifiable arbitral institution.”). 
209 HKL Group Co., [2013] SGHCR 5, ¶¶ 28–29, 37  (“I will stay the proceedings, but, given the defect in the 
arbitration clause, I impose the condition that parties obtain the agreement of the SIAC or any other arbitral institu-
tion in Singapore to conduct a hybrid arbitration applying the ICC rules . . . .”).  See also HKL Group Co. v. Rizq 
International Holding Pte. Ldt. [2013] SGHCR 8, ¶ 12 (maintaining the condition but clarifying that hybrid 
arbitration is just one of several options).  This is probably also what the Court is referring to with the unclear 
remark on “with liberty to apply should they fail to secure any such agreement.”  HKL Group Co., [2013] SGHCR 
5, ¶ 37.  
 
211 Id. at ¶ 38.   
212 Id.   
213 Id.   
214 The court invited, however, the parties to agree on pure institutional arbitration, thereby avoiding “the procedur-
al gymnastics of […] hybrid arbitration.”  Id.  Accordingly, the parties subsequently agreed on SIAC arbitration.  
HKL Group Co., [2013] SGHCR 8, ¶ 4.   
215 Lucky-Goldstar Int’l (H.K.) Ltd. v. Ng Moo Kee Eng’g Ltd., [1993] 1 H.K.C. 404, 409 (H.K.).  
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to both the arbitral institution and the place of arbitration, it will suffice to note that the 
Singapore courts will, consistent with the approach under international arbitration law, 
give primacy to the decision of the parties to arbitrate and will seek to resolve the vari-
ous pathologies with the aid of the principle of effective interpretation.  (emphasis add-
ed)216 
Although the arbitration agreement’s statement of place of arbitration (Singapore) 
and applicable arbitration rules (ICC) may be said to limit the specific importance of the 
pathology in HKL Group, there is no basis for assuming that the presence of such addi-
tional (operable) procedural rules will be decisive.  As is the case in the Hong Kong 
decisions, the essential issue is the parties’ intention to arbitrate, as expressed in the 
arbitration agreement,217 and the resulting distinction between the jurisdictional alloca-
tion—which takes precedence (“primacy”)—and the (secondary) procedural rules, 
which if necessary are interpreted and supplemented by the courts in light of the object 
of upholding the parties’ wish to arbitrate.218 
This approach is generally confirmed in KVC Rice,219 which enforces two arbitra-
tion agreements, which—in addition to meaningless references to “Indian Contract 
Rules” and “Singapore Contract Rules” respectively—are blank, with reference to the 
default mechanism in respect of the appointment of the arbitration tribunal.220  Since the 
question in KVC Rice solely was, whether the arbitration agreements provided the basis 
for staying the legal proceedings, the Singapore High Court did not resolve the question 
as to the specific importance of the meaningless/non-existing element.221  However, the 
court noted that “It is well known and accepted that courts will disregard meaningless 
words in arbitration clauses in order to construe such clauses in a workable manner”, 
with reference to Lucky Goldstar and HKL Group.222 
 
 
V. ENGLISH LAW 
 
There is no basis for assuming that the English courts will take a fundamentally dif-
ferent approach than that reflected in case law from the Model Law countries Hong 
Kong and Singapore (see Part IV above).  As stated in Russell on Arbitration—with 
reference to Lucky Goldstar and HKL Group: “The arbitration agreement will not be 
                                                      
216 HKL Group Co., [2013] SGHCR 5, ¶ 24.   
217 Id. at ¶ 27. (“[C]learly evinces the intention of the parties to resolve any dispute by [mandatory] arbitration”); 
see also Lucky-Goldstar Int’l (H.K.) Ltd., [1993] 1 H.K.C. at 408 (“[T]he parties have clearly expressed the inten-
tion to arbitrate any dispute”); Guangdong Agriculture Company Ltd., [1993] 1 H.K.L.R. at ¶ 9 (“[T]he parties 
plainly agreed to settle any dispute by arbitration.”). 
218 HKL Group Co., [2013] SGHCR 5, ¶¶ 24–27. 
219 K.V.C. Rice Intertrade Co. Ltd. v. Asian Mineral Res. Pte. Ltd. [2017] SGHC 32. 
220 Id. at ¶ 54. 
221 Id. 
222 K.V.C. Rice Intertrade Co Ltd., [2017] SGHC 32, ¶ 53. 
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inoperative or incapable of being performed just because reference is made to the rules 
of a non-existent arbitration institution, provided the underlying intention to arbitrate is 
clear.”223  Further, as stated by David Joseph: 
[I]t is suggested that an English court is likely to conclude that the parties’ agree-
ment to arbitrate should remain enforceable. Without more, the parties will be taken to 
have still intended to arbitrate at the particular seat under the general provisions appli-
cable by reference to the governing arbitration law but not under the auspices of the 
identified but failed rules/institution.” (emphasis added)224 
Where Hong Kong and Singapore follow the default mechanism of the Model Law 
in respect of the courts’ assistance in appointing the arbitration tribunal, the English 
“gateway”225 is, however, worded differently in the English Arbitration Act (EAA), 
section 18: 
(1) The parties are free to agree what is to happen in the event of a failure of the 
procedure for the appointment of the arbitral tribunal. […] 
(2) If or to the extent that there is no such agreement any party to the arbitration 
agreement may (upon notice to the other parties) apply to the court to exercise its pow-
ers under this section. 
(3) Those powers are -  
(a) to give directions as to the making of any necessary appointments; 
(b) to direct that the tribunal shall be constituted by such appointments (or anyone 
or more of them) as have been made; 
 (c) to revoke any appointments already made; 
 (d) to make any necessary appointments itself.226 
The English courts’ jurisdiction thus appear to be—even if drafted in light of the 
Model Law227—more flexible (unpredictable) than the same in the Model Law, both in 
respect of whether the courts will assist, and if so, which measures (“powers”) the 
courts will take.  However, in respect of a view on “unfettered discretion”, the English 
High Court has stated: 
Respect for this principle [of party autonomy] and the desirability of holding the 
parties to their agreement together provide strong grounds for exercising the court’s 
discretion in favour of constituting the tribunal except in the small number of cases in 
                                                      
223 DAVID ST. JOHN SUTTON, JUDITH GILL, & MATTHEW GEARING, RUSSELL ON ARBITRATION 7 (24th ed. 2015) 
(emphasis added); see also BORN, supra note 11, at 783 (labelling Lucky-Goldstar Int’l (H.K.) Ltd. v. Ng Moo Kee 
Eng’g Ltd., [1993] 1 H.K.C. 404 as a “leading authority.”).  
224 DAVID JOSEPH, JURISDICTION AND ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS AND THEIR ENFORCEMENT ¶ 4.86 (3d ed.  
2015). 
225 SUTTON ET AL., supra note 223, at ¶ 7–100. 
226 English Arbitration Act 1996, c. 23, § 18.  
227 DEPARTMENTAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON ARBITRATION LAW, REPORT ON THE ARBITRATION BILL, 1996, ¶ 
87 (UK) (“[W]e have had the Model Law in mind when drafting this provision.”); see also BRUCE HARRIS, ROWAN 
PLANTEROSE & JONATHAN TECKS, THE ARBITRATION ACT 1996: A COMMENTARY 112 (5th ed. 2014).  
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which it can be seen that the arbitral process cannot result in a fair resolution of the 
dispute.  (emphasis added)228 
The English courts are thus prepared—as a clear main rule—to assist in the ap-
pointment of the arbitration tribunal and thus support the operability of the arbitration 
agreement.229  The High Court also emphasized that it would be “contrary to the spirit 
of the [New York] Convention”, if one country’s courts are obliged to dismiss actions 
on disputes subject to an arbitration agreement, while another country’s courts reject 
assisting in the appointment of the arbitration tribunal under the same arbitration 
agreement.230  Maintaining a consistent international framework regulation, which 
counteracts that the parties remain in limbo, must be a strong consideration. 
EAA section 18 applies generally in the event of “the failure of the appointment 
procedure,” including also “if an appointing person or body no longer existed.”231  In 
such event, the English court may either decide that the appointment be made by anoth-
er person/institution, or make the appointment itself.232  To illustrate this, see Chalbury 
McCouat International Ltd. v. P G Foils Ltd.,  where the High Court, with reference to 
the international aspects of the case, found that the LCIA president “should make the 
necessary appointment of an [a]rbitrator and that the arbitral tribunal shall be constitut-
ed by that appointment.”233 
The English High Court’s ruling in China Agribusiness Development Corp. v. Balli 
Trading234 is interesting even though it does not concern a ‘pure’ event of inaccessibil-
ity.  A contract between international parties stated that disputes “shall then be submit-
ted for arbitration to the [FETAC] in accordance with the Provisional Rules of Proce-
dure of the [FETAC].”235  FETAC did exist, but the question was whether arbitration 
should take place according to the stated “Provisional Rules”–which already prior to 
entering the contract were outdated–or according to the Rules in force from time to 
time.236  
After the conclusion of the contract but before the dispute arose, FETAC changed 
its name to CIETAC, but it was undisputed in the case that CIETAC was the proper 
arbitration institution.237  CIETAC arbitration in China was carried through based on 
CIETAC’s applicable rules.  During the enforcement proceedings in England, the Eng-
                                                      
228 Atlanska Plovidba & Anor, [2004] EWHC 1273 (Comm) [24] (Moore-Bick J). 
229 Id. at ¶ 39. 
230 Id. at ¶ 33 (“If the defendant sought to pursue a claim that fell within the arbitration agreement in Spain, the 
court would be bound to grant a stay under the New York Convention.  In these circumstances it would be contrary 
to the spirit of the Convention for this court to refuse to exercise its power to appoint an arbitrator.”). 
231 HARRIS ET AL., supra note 227, at 112. 
232 Id. at 114. 
233 Chalbury McCouat Int’l Ltd. v. P.G. Foils Ltd., [2010] EWHC 2050 (TCC). 
234 China Agribusiness Dev. Corp. v. Balli Trading, [1998] 2 Lloyd’s Law Rep 76 (English High Court). 
235 Id. at 76.  
236 Id.  
237 Id. at 77.  
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lish party claimed that the arbitration proceedings were not in compliance with the par-
ties' agreement238 with reference to the parties having “agreed to arbitration under the 
old provsional rules” and “[i]f that agreement could not be performed there was no 
arbitration agreement.”239 
The High Court concluded in favor of the applicable rules,240 with reference to the 
fact that the arbitration agreement would otherwise be inoperable:241  
 if the agreement were to be construed as an agreement to arbitrate only under the 
provisional rules, the parties would have agreed to do something impossible. Of course, 
parties to a contract are free to agree something which is in the event impossible and the 
Courts will have to determine the legal consequence, but a Court will try to avoid im-
puting to the parties an intention to do something which cannot be done. (emphasis 
added)242 
Interesting in a broader perspective is also the High Court’s framing of the im-
portant issue of the case: 
The question here is whether the parties have agreed that there shall be arbitration . 
. . in China, or whether they have gone further and agreed that if any arbitration is to 
take place it will only take place in China under provisional and out of date rules, and if 
that cannot be done there is to be no arbitration at all. (emphasis added) 243  
The parties had not used “clear enough words” to obtain the latter result.244  In line 
with this is also Khan v. Dell Inc., where the US American circuit court held that “the 
parties must have unambiguously expressed their intent not to arbitrate their disputes in 
the event that the designated arbitral forum is unavailable.”245 
See in this respect also Comtec Components Ltd. v. Interquip Ltd.,246 where the ar-
bitration tribunal, according to the agreement, should be appointed by HKIAC, which, 
however, rejected to arrange for the appointment.  The court in Hong Kong did not find 
that this immediate inaccessibility was fatal to the arbitration agreement:  
 I do not believe that the initial refusal by the HKIAC to make an appointment 
makes the arbitration agreement incapable of being performed. The parties are free to 
agree on an arbitrator. […] In the last resort, this court, I believe, has a residuary juris-
                                                      
238 Compare the English Arbitration Act 1996, c. 23, § 103(2)(e) which incorporates the New York Convention, 
supra note 15, at art. V(1)(d). 
239 China Agribusiness Dev. Corp., [1998] 2 Lloyd’s Law Rep. 76, at 77–78.  
240 Id. at 78.  
241 Id. at 79.  Further, the High Court emphasized that “the word ‘provisional’ is no more than a word of identifica-
tion, not a word of differentiation intended to indicate an earlier version of rules by which, and by which alone, the 
parties were to be bound.”  Id. at 78. 
242 Id. at 79. 
243 Id. 
244 Id. 
245 Khan v. Dell Inc., 669 F.3d 350, 354 (3d Cir. 2012).; see supra Part III.D. 
246 Comtec Components Ltd. v. Interquip Ltd., [1998] HKCFI 803. 
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diction to make an appointment to implement the intention of the parties that their dis-
putes should be resolved by arbitration.247 
Obviously, the main rule to be derived from the aforementioned case law is that 
pathological procedural rules do not “infect” the jurisdictional allocation.248 
 
VI. DISTINCTION: DOUBT ABOUT THE JURISDICTIONAL ALLOCATION ITSELF 
 
In compliance with the basic distinction between jurisdictional allocation and pro-
cedural rules, it is important to distinguish those situations where the arbitration agree-
ment not only contains a pathological procedural rule, but also raises doubts as to 
whether the provision actually contains a prorogation, such as a choice of arbitration. 
In the English Flight Training International v. International Fire Training Equip-
ment Ltd., the “Settlement of Disputes” provision in a contract for the delivery of anti-
terror training facilities between an American and an English business set out that dis-
putes “shall be submitted to the Advisory, Conciliation and Arbitration Services (ACAS) 
London.  Legal fees and costs shall be paid by either party which does not prevail at 
mediation” (emphasis added).249  However, ACAS did not administer commercial dis-
putes and therefore refused the request from the American party, who then requested 
the English courts assist in appointing an arbitration tribunal.250  The High Court dis-
missed the request with reference to the fact that there was no arbitration agreement: 
 [The clause] does not incorporate an agreement to submit future disputes to arbi-
tration. It refers disputes to a body which does not deal with the resolution of commer-
cial disputes, but which, in the field of employment relations and related matters pro-
vides conciliation services, mediation services and arbitration services. I emphasize that 
these three sets of services are distinct. [The clause] specifically refers to ‘mediation’ in 
the second sentence. This provides a strong indication of an intention to select media-
tion out of the services provided by ACAS.251 
Flight Training and Teck Guan are both characterized by the fact that the interpre-
tation issues cannot be isolated to a question of inoperable procedural rules, since it is 
essentially questionable whether the parties had agreed to resolve disputes by arbitra-
tion.  This interpretation situation is thus fundamentally different compared to the most 
frequently occurring events, where it must be decided—based on a clear jurisdictional 
allocation—what importance pathological procedural rules have with respect to the 
                                                      
247 Id. 
248 See id. 
249 Flight Training International v. International Fire Training Equipment Ltd., [2004] EWHC (Comm) 721. 
250 Id. 
 
251 Id.; see also Teck Guan Sdn Bhd v. Beow Guan Enterprises Pte Ltd., [2003] 4 SLR 276 (where the provision 
“any dispute . . . to be governed by the rules of the Cocoa Merchants’ Association of America Inc.” did not consti-
tute an arbitration agreement because the CMAA’s rules do not give the parties the right or the obligation to arbi-
trate). 
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enforcement and operability of the arbitration agreement.  Judgments like these there-
fore do not contradict the fundamental distinction between jurisdictional allocation and 
procedural rules, which is the general theme in case law, and the judgments are not an 
expression of a restrictive interpretive approach towards arbitration agreements.  In-
deed, if anything, these decisions underline the fundamental distinction between the 
jurisdictional allocation and procedural rules and the fundamental importance of the 
arbitration agreement containing a prorogation.   
Compare Lovelock Ltd. v. Exportles,252 where the English Court of Appeal rejects 
the independent importance of one of the two hopelessly conflicting parts of the arbitra-
tion agreement, because the appointing authority to which this part of the arbitration 
agreement referred, refused to make the appointment.253  Lovelock is peculiar and has 
not created a precedent for a particularly restrictive interpretation principle in English 
law.  
If the dispute resolution provision merely refers to an institution, which provides 
different forms of alternative dispute resolution, and where arbitration is merely one 
among several options of equal standing, an immediate prorogation for arbitration does 
not exist, unless there is a separate basis for establishing that the parties have chosen 
arbitration.  However, this does not change the fact that the derogation in such events is 
typically clear. The parties have chosen not to use litigation; it is merely unclear which 
ADR procedure should be applied instead.  Against this background, it hardly takes 
much for establishing that an arbitration agreement exists.254  A heading alone (‘Arbi-
tration’) must therefore be sufficient, unless headings have been agreed to have no in-
terpretative importance, just as other terms in the provision (“final and binding,” 
“award,” etc.) can point in that direction.   
In light of Flight Training, it may be considered whether an arbitration agreement 
exists, if a provision merely refers to the fact that disputes “shall be submitted to the 
advisory, conciliation and arbitration services of” an existing and accessible institu-
tion.255  The derogation (opting out litigation) is clear, but–as also pointed out by the 
High Court in Flight Training–the listed services are different, and therefore proroga-
tion (of arbitration) is not certain unless a choice is made or can otherwise be de-
duced.256  In such cases, it may be important whether it follows from the institutional 
rules in question that the parties ultimately must resolve disputes by arbitration. 
                                                      
252 Lovelock Ltd. v. Exportles, [1968] 1 Lloyd’s Law Report 163 (English Court of Appeal). 
253 Lovelock, [1968] 1 Lloyd’s Law Report 163 at 166–67 (“So the first part of the clause could not be operated”) 
(Lord Denning) (“proved impossible to work the provisions of the clause . . . because of the refusal of the chairman 
of the [institution] to appoint an umpire”) (Diplock LJ). 
254 Joseph, supra note 13, (“[T]he clause might not be enforceable as an arbitration agreement if the institution in 
question conducts both conciliation and arbitration. . . . However, it will be seen below that, as long as parties do 
evidence an intention to refer disputes to arbitration, the courts will strive to uphold that bargain.”). 
255 See Flight Training Int’l, [2004] EWHC 721. 
256 See id. 
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In this respect, TMT257 from Singapore must be mentioned.  The case concerned the 
following “Arbitration” provision in a trading account agreement (referred to as “FAA 
Account Agreement”) between a Liberian company (TMT) and The Royal Bank of 
Scotland (RBS):  
Any dispute arising from or relating to these terms or any Contract made hereunder 
shall, unless resolved between us, be referred to arbitration under the arbitration rules 
of the relevant exchange or any other organisation as the relevant exchange may direct 
and both parties agree to, such agreement not to be unreasonabl[y] withheld, before 
either of us resort to the jurisdiction of the Court. (emphasis added)258  
TMT summoned RBS before the courts in Singapore.259  RBS claimed that the case 
be stayed–with reference to the fact that the dispute was subject to the arbitration 
agreement–to which TMT objected and stated that the arbitration agreement presup-
posed the involvement of a “relevant exchange,” which was not the case since the trade 
under the FAA agreement had been concluded through a clearing house, which is not 
an exchange.260  This fact was undisputed.261  Even though the High Court rejected the 
case on other grounds subject to a choice of venue agreement in a “Settlement Agree-
ment,” the court found reason to state (obiter) that the arbitration agreement did not 
justify dismissal of the case by the courts:262 
The difficulty is apparent from the plain words. [The arbitration clause] clearly 
contemplates that there be an exchange. . . .  Thus, it is clear that the existence of an 
exchange was required for a dispute to be under the scope of the arbitration agreement. 
No exchange was however involved in the present matters. The trades were carried out 
through a clearing house, which is a different type of organisation. (emphasis added)263 
In the view of the High Court, the scope of the arbitration agreement is thus limited 
to disputes involving an “exchange,” i.e., no jurisdictional allocation exists in respect of 
the dispute in question because no “exchange” was involved.264  This interpretation is 
                                                      
257 TMT Co., Ltd. v. The Royal Bank of Scotland plc., [2017] SGHC 21.  
258 Id. 
259 Id. 
260 Id.  Under the FAA agreement, TMT (the plaintiff) traded in forward freight agreements and options ("FFAs").  
Id.  These trades were cleared by The Royal Bank of Scotland (defendant) via the London Clearing House, where 
RBS was "Clearing Member."  Id.  Initially, TMT had brought a breach of contract action before the English 
Commercial Court seeking compensation for loss in connection with these trades.  Id.  The litigation was settled by 
a "Settlement Agreement" according to which the English courts had jurisdiction.  Id.  Subsequently, TMT sum-
moned RBS (and RBS’ branch in Singapore and certain employees) before the Singaporean courts with new claims 




264 Id.  The High Court rejects the defendant’s assertion that the arbitration agreement’s reference to “exchange” 
should be broadly interpreted to also include “clearing house”—although this potentially implies the division of 
claims into multiple forums as this “is what the parties bargained for, and the Courts would be slow to override the 
plain words in the parties’ agreement.”  Id. 
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strained.  First, the “coupling” of the scope of the arbitration agreement and the proce-
dural rules is worrying; the scope is clearly and broadly stated to be “[a]ny dispute 
arising from or relating to these terms or any Contract made hereunder.”265  Second, the 
court’s interpretation apparently implies that no disputes under the FAA agreement are 
subject to the arbitration provision in that very agreement.266  It does not improve mat-
ters when the High Court initially finds reason to note (obiter) that “[i]t may be also that 
the [arbitration] clause fails the third criteria, as it is inoperative or incapable of being 
performed.  I do not think that the precise criteria matters here.”267  
The court’s reference to the “third criteria” is a reference to the last of the three 
preconditions that must be fulfilled in order to obtain a successful stay application in 
Singapore: (i) “valid arbitration agreement”, (ii) “dispute . . . falls within the scope of 
the arbitration agreement,” and (iii) “the arbitration agreement is not null and void, 
inoperative or incapable of being performed.”268  It is clear that the court does not find 
reason to conduct a thorough analysis of the question, including considering existing 
case law, for the very reason that the case is resolved based on other circumstances and 
because the dispute also–in the court’s opinion–does not fall under the scope of the 
arbitration agreement.  
On the other hand, if by implication it is considered that the dispute falls under the 
scope of the arbitration agreement, a correct application of the law—see this respect in 
particular Lucky-Goldstar, Insigma, HKL Group, KVC Rice, and the principles in these 
rulings–with a wording corresponding to the one in TMT, all other things being equal, 
implies that the parties have agreed on the jurisdictional allocation, “[a]ny dispute shall 
be referred to arbitration,” but have referred to procedural rules that in reality are non-
existing and inaccessible to the parties.  If there is no basis for interpreting “relevant 
exchange” to also include “clearing house” (Solution 1, which will not be pursued fur-
ther here), the pathological procedural rule must be disregarded in the enforcement of 
the jurisdictional allocation (Solution 2), unless there are clear and specific indications 
supporting that the procedural rule was important for the jurisdictional allocation (Solu-
tion 3). 
 
VII. SUMMARY AND CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
Non-existing and inaccessible elements constitute an interesting pathology.  First, 
there is undeniably a comical aspect in commercial parties writing elements into a con-
tract, which quite simply do not exist.  Second, it is difficult to contest that the proce-
                                                      
265 Id. 
266 See also id. (where the Court notes that the arbitration agreement “does not on its face apply to the present 
dispute, or conceivably to most, if not all, possible disputes between the parties in this case”). 
267 Id. at ¶ 64.  
268 Tomolugen Holdings Ltd and another v. Silica Investors Ltd and other appeals [2015] SGCA 57, ¶ 63. 
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dure agreed upon by the parties is de facto inoperable.  Intuitively, it is therefore tempt-
ing to jump to the conclusion that an arbitration procedure cannot be carried through. 
However, this assumption ignores the general contract law principles concerning 
mistake and frustration (US American law and English law)269, which do not equate 
non-existence or inaccessibility with the deprivation of the entire agreement’s binding 
effects, but, on the contrary, necessitate a specific evaluation of materiality.  Also, the 
assumption overlooks the special nature of the arbitration agreement, the arbitration law 
gap-filling rules (the default mechanism), and not least the parties’ typical intention and 
purpose of incorporating arbitration provisions in commercial contracts. 
In compliance with this, case law across multiple jurisdictions takes an approach 
where non-existing and inaccessible elements as a main rule do not “infect” the juris-
dictional allocation.270  In other words, the arbitration agreement is not “null and void, 
inoperative or incapable of being performed” merely because the procedural rules are 
inoperable.271  
In US American case law, it is decisive whether the parties’ dominant purpose or 
primary intention, as expressed in the arbitration agreement, is the jurisdictional alloca-
tion (“settle disputes by arbitration”) rather than the procedural rules (“the instrumental-
ity,” “the machinery”).272  Unless clear specific indications support that the inoperable 
procedural rule was material for the arbitration agreement,273 it is assumed that the 
dominant purpose of incorporating the jurisdictional allocation in the contract was to 
ensure dispute resolution by arbitration, and the arbitration agreement is cured by sever-
ing the secondary or immaterial procedural rule.  The remaining arbitration agreement 
is enforced and supplemented by the courts (Solution 2). 
Correspondingly, the essence of case law from Hong Kong, Singapore, and Eng-
land is the parties’ intention to arbitrate274 and the following distinction between a pri-
                                                      
269 See supra notes 103–04, 155 and accompanying text.  
270 See supra notes 9–10 and accompanying text. 
271 TMT Co., Ltd. v. The Royal Bank of Scotland plc., [2017] SGHC 21, ¶ 63. 
272 See generally Khan v. Dell Inc., 669 F.3d 350, 354 (3d Cir. 2012). 
273 See id. (“the parties must have unambiguously expressed their intent not to arbitrate their disputes in the event 
that the designated arbitral forum is unavailable”, and references herein, internal quotation marks and square brack-
ets omitted); Gar Energy & Assocs. v. Ivanhoe Energy Inc., No. 1:11–CV–00907 AWI JLT, 2011 WL 6780927, at 
*9 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 27, 2011) (“There is no evidence [that] the parties’ agreement to arbitrate depended on the use 
of the [non-existent] rules, or that a material term of the arbitration agreement was the use of these rules.”); 
Kwasny Company v. Acrylicon Int’l Ltd., No. 09-13357, 2010 WL 2474788, at *6 (E.D. Mich. June 11, 2010) 
(“Defendant has failed to identify any basis for the Court to conclude that the parties’ mistaken reference to a non-
existent arbitration body in their Agreement should be viewed as integral to, and not severable from, the parties' 
expressly stated intent to arbitrate”.); Brown v. ITT Consumer Fin. Corp., 211 F.3d 1217, 1222 (11th Cir. 2000) 
(“Here there is no evidence that the choice of the NAF as the arbitration forum was an integral part of the agree-
ment to arbitrate.”); Stinson v. America’s. Home Place, Inc., 108 F. Supp. 2d 1278, 1285 (M.D. Ala. 2000) 
(“[T]here is no indication that the choice of that particular arbitrator was central to the arbitration clause.”). 
274 HKL Group Co. Ltd. v. Rizq Int’l Holding Pte. Ltd., [2013] SGHCR 5, ¶ 27 (“clearly evi[de]nces the intention 
of the parties to resolve any dispute by arbitration”); Lucky-Goldstar Int’l (H.K.) Ltd. v. Ng Moo Kee Eng’g Ltd., 
[1993] 1 H.K.C. 404, 408 (H.K.)  (“[C]learly expressed the intention to arbitrate any dispute . . . .”); China Agri-
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mary jurisdictional allocation and secondary procedural rules and where the latter is 
interpreted and supplemented in light of the concern for upholding the jurisdictional 
allocation.275  As is the case under US American law, the arbitration agreement is cured 
by severing the inoperable procedural rule (Solution 2), unless clear and specific indica-
tions support that the procedural rule was material for the jurisdictional allocation (So-
lution 3).276  If necessary, a party may subsequently request the courts assistance ac-
cording to lex arbitri.277  Even though certain cases emphasize that the jurisdictional 
allocation is clearly expressed,278 case law does not suggest that this implies a special 
clarity requirement.279  
Correspondingly, it does not appear to be a special element in the assessment 
whether the jurisdictional allocation is specifically worded as a separate part in relation 
to the pathological procedural rule—as is the case in Travelport280 and Warnes,281 but 
not in HZI Research282 and Astra Footwear.283  This is also corresponding in Lucky-
                                                                                                                                          
business Development Corporation v. Balli Trading [1998] 2 Lloyd’s Law Rep. 76, 79 (English High Court) (“the 
parties intended to and did agree that there was to be arbitration in China”); Guangdong Agriculture Company Ltd. 
v. Conagra International (Far East) Ltd., [1993] 1 H.K.L.R., at ¶ 9 (H.C.) (“[T]he parties plainly agreed to settle 
any dispute by arbitration.”). 
275 HKL Group Co. Ltd. [2013] SGHCR. 5, ¶ 24 (“give primacy to the decision of the parties to arbitrate and will 
seek to resolve the various pathologies with the aid of the principle of effective interpretation.”); China Agribusi-
ness Dev. Corp., [1998] 2 Lloyd’s Law Rep. 76, at 79 (“a Court will try to avoid imputing to the parties an inten-
tion to do something which cannot be done.”); Lucky-Goldstar Int’l (H.K.) Ltd., [1993] 1 H.K.C. at 408 (“[S]o as to 
be able to give effect to the clear intention of the parties.”).  
276 See cases cited supra note 89. 
277HKL Group Co. Ltd. [2013] SGHCR. 5, ¶ 37 (“with liberty to apply should they fail to secure any such agree-
ment”); Comtec Components Ltd. v. Interquip Ltd., [1998] HKCFI 803, ¶ 10 (“In the last resort, this court, I be-
lieve, has a residuary jurisdiction to make an appointment to implement the intention of the parties that their dis-
putes should be resolved by arbitration.”); Lucky-Goldstar Int’l (H.K.) Ltd., [1993] 1 H.K.C. at 404 (“As there are 
no rules of this non-existent organization the arbitration has to be conducted under the law of the third country 
chosen by the plaintiffs.”); id. at 406; Guangdong Agriculture Company Ltd., [1993] 1 H.K.L.R., at ¶ 9 (H.C.) 
(“Should the parties be unable to agree the precise number of arbitrators or the rules to be followed, the Model Law 
will assist them.”). 
278 Travelport Glob. Distrib. Sys. B.V. v. Bellview Airlines Ltd., 2012 WL 3925856, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 12, 
2012) (“The parties clearly expressed their intention to resolve this dispute through arbitration . . . .”); In re HZI 
Research Ctr. v. Sun Instruments Japan Co., 1995 WL 562181, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 20, 1995) (“The dominant 
purpose of the parties, clearly expressed in their contract, was to resolve disputes by arbitration.”). 
279 Also Control Screening LLC v. Technological Application & Prod. Co., 687 F.3d 163, 170 (3d Cir. 2012) 
(“[T]here is sufficient indication elsewhere in the contract of the parties’ intent to arbitrate.”). 
280 The arbitration agreement in Travelport, 2012 WL 3925856, at *1 (“[1] arbitration in the United States [2] in 
accordance with the UNCITRAL Arbitration rules in force at the date of reference. The Appointing Authority shall 
be the United States Council of Arbitration and such appointment will be in accordance with its ‘Procedures for 
Arbitration.’”). 
281 The arbitration agreement in Warnes S.A. v. Harvic Int’l, Ltd., 1993 WL 228028, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. June 22, 
1993) (“[1] shall be finally settled by arbitration [2] in New York in accordance with the Commercial Arbitration 
Rules of the New York Commercial Arbitration Association.”). 
282 The arbitration agreement in HZI Research, 1995 WL 562181, at *2 (“[E]ach party shall select an arbitrator and 
the two arbitrators shall select a third arbitrator, all of whom shall be Members of the American or Japanese Arbi-
trator Society, who will resolve the dispute.”). 
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Goldstar284 versus HKL Group.285 This is consistent with the fact that a restrictive in-
terpretation of an arbitration agreement is not justitied.286  However, this may be taken 
into account as part of an overall assessment.287  Add to this that institutions and rules, 
which do not exist and which the parties therefore cannot have had any meaningful 
knowledge of, cannot easily be presumed to constitute a principal condition for the 
jurisdictional allocation. 
In general, US American courts are not reluctant to supplement the arbitration 
agreement with new procedural rules, either though the FAA’s gap-filling rules or on a 
discretionary basis.  This activist approach—which is supported by the purpose behind 
the FAA—is effective in terms of the enforcement of the prorogation agreement but 
differs substantially from the Model Law’s safety valve default mechanism.  Character-
istic for case law from Singapore and Hong Kong is—in compliance with the Model 
Law system—that the gap-filling of the arbitration agreement is first left to the parties, 
who, if necessary, may proceed in accordance with the default mechanism.  This hands-
off approach to a greater extent respects the fundamental arbitration law principle about 
party autonomy in the procedure. 
In conclusion, arbitration agreements containing non-existing and inaccessible ele-
ments are interpreted according to the following main principles: 
(1) There is a basic distinction between the jurisdictional allocation (components I 
and II) and the procedural rules (component III).  
                                                                                                                                          
283 The arbitration agreement in Astra Footwear Industy v. Harwyn International, Inc., 442 F.Supp. 907, 908 
(S.D.N.Y. 1978) (“In the case that the buyer is accused, the Chamber of Commerce in New York is competent.”). 
284 The arbitration agreement in Lucky-Goldstar: “[1] Any dispute […] shall be arbitrated […] [2] in accordance 
with the rules of procedure of the International Commercial Arbitration Association.” Lucky-Goldstar Int’l (H.K.) 
Ltd. v. Ng Moo Kee Eng’g Ltd., [1993] 1 H.K.C. 404, 404 (H.K.). 
285 HKL Group Co. Ltd. v. Rizq Int’l Holding Pte. Ltd., [2013] SGHCR 5, ¶ 1 (“[A]ll disputes […] shall be settled 
by the Arbitration Committee at Singapore under the rules of The International Chamber of Commerce.”). 
286 See e.g. BLACKABY ET AL., supra note 11, at ¶ 2.66; BORN, supra note 11, at 1343; STEINGRUBER, supra note 
32, at ¶ 7.37 (Loukas Mistelis eds., 2012) (“A restrictive interpretation is, however, not justified in international 
arbitration”); Alok Jain, Pathological Arbitration Clauses and Indian Courts, 25 J. INT’L ARB. 433, 445 (2008) 
(“[T]he said view is archaic. Arbitration is now unanimously considered to be a normal means of settling disputes. 
It is no longer an exception but an accepted means of dispute resolution which is statutorily approved and widely 
resorted to, to resolve disputes.”); JEAN-FRANÇOIS POUDRET & SÉBASTIEN BASSO, COMPARATIVE LAW OF INTER-
NATIONAL ARBITRATION 3.6.1 (2d ed. 2007) (“we believe that a restrictive interpretation is not justified in interna-
tional arbitration”);  FOUCHARD & GOLDMAN, supra note 12, at 260 (“However, this principle [of strict interpreta-
tion] is generally rejected in international arbitration. It is based on the idea that an arbitration agreement consti-
tutes an exception to the principle of the jurisdiction of the courts, and that, as laws of exception are strictly inter-
preted, the same should apply to arbitration agreements. This view is not consistent with the fact that arbitration is 
now unanimously considered to be a normal means of settling international disputes.”). 
287 Kwasny Company v. Acrylicon International Ltd, No. 09-13357, 2010 WL 2474788, at *6 (E.D. Mich. June 11, 
2010) (“the parties’ broad and overarching agreement to arbitrate any dispute arising out of or relating to the 
Agreement”); Gar Energy & Assocs. v. Ivanhoe Energy Inc., No. 1:11–CV–00907 AWI JLT, 2011 WL 6780927, 
at *9 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 27, 2011) (“[T]he material portion of the agreement is the commitment to arbitrate the 
claims.”).  
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(2) As a main rule, the pathological procedural rule does not “infect” the jurisdic-
tional allocation.  The non-existing and inaccessible element is severed, and a party 
may, if necessary, request the courts’ assistance in accordance with the default mecha-
nism for supplementing the arbitration agreement (Solution 2). 
(3) The main rule is deviated from if either (i) an interpretative basis for identify-
ing an existing and accessible element exists (Solution 1); (ii) clear and specific indica-
tions support that the inoperable procedural rule was material for the jurisdictional allo-
cation (Solution 3); or (iii) if the pathology directly undermines the existence of the 
jurisdictional allocation (Solution 3). 
(4) Re. (ii) The fact alone that the arbitration agreement names specific persons, in-
stitutions, or rules is not sufficient to depart from the main rule.  In principle it is not 
important whether the pathology is due to non-existence or inaccessibility, even though 
it is more difficult to establish importance having been placed on this by the parties in 
respect of the former. 
(5) Re. (iii) Jurisdictional allocation does not presuppose that a derogation agree-
ment, a prorogation agreement as well as (clear and operable) procedural rules can be 
separately identified. The decisive issue is whether a prorogation can still be identified 
(and thus also implicitly a derogation) – when disregarding the non-existing and inac-
cessible element.288 
(6) Enforcement of the derogation agreement, through the courts’ obligation to re-
fer or stay, is not conditional upon clear and operable procedural rules, and pathological 
procedural rules do not inherently imply increased clarity requirements in the proroga-
tion agreement. 
In terms of drafting, non-existing elements may be avoided by duly checking the 
name of the choice of institution, including by being careful when using machine or 
automated translations.  If it is necessary to translate the name of the institution, guid-
ance may be provided on the institution’s official website or articles of association.  In 
cases of doubt, the institution’s “original” name, physical address, website address or 
similar objectively identifiable element should be stated in brackets in the translation. 
Classical examples are cases where the arbitration agreement refers to ICC in a 
specific city, for example “ICC of Geneva” or “ICC in London.”  Since only one ICC 
exists, which is domiciled in Paris, it may initially be argued that “ICC in London” is 
non-existent.  However, it is generally assumed that such references be interpreted as a 
reference to ICC arbitration with the city in question as the place of arbitration.289 
However, an indication of place is not sufficient to consider the well-known institu-
tion, which is domiciled in the place in question, as agreed upon if there is an obvious 
linguistic discrepancy between the pathological element of the agreement with the spe-
                                                      
288 See supra pp. 13, 18–19. 
289 See e.g. BORN, supra note 11, at 780–81;  LEW ET AL., supra note 1, at ¶¶ 7-76; FOUCHARD & GOLDMAN, supra 
note 12, at 264–265; Jean Benglia, Inaccurate Reference to the ICC, 7 ICC COURT BULL. 11, 11–13 (1996); Davis, 
supra note 24. 
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cific characteristics and the institution’s correct designation.  For instance, SIAC has 
refused jurisdiction in cases where the arbitration agreement referred to “the Interna-
tional Chamber of Trade of Singapore” and “A.A.L.C.C. Regional Centre for Commer-
cial Arbitration at Singapore.”290  
It is different, under the circumstances, if a pathological element with generic char-
acteristics exists, which specifically points at institutional arbitration in a specific place, 
and no specific indications support that the parties aimed at another institution than the 
well-known institution in the place in question.  Arbitration tribunals under the SCC 
have thus for example acknowledged jurisdiction in relation to arbitration provisions 
referring to “the Arbitration Court of Stockholm (Sweden)” and “the Arbitration Com-
mittee of Sweden,” whereas the SCC has refused (prima facie) jurisdiction in respect of 
references such as “a court of arbitration in Stockholm”291 
Inaccessible elements which were accessible at the time of entering into the con-
tract, but which for other reasons are not any longer accessible to the parties, may be 
difficult to safeguard against.  An institution’s failure to accept jurisdiction may be due 
to many reasons that the parties do not necessarily control.  The institution is not 
obliged to take the case unless the institution has provided a preliminary approval, 
which is hardly practically relevant for arbitration provisions concerning future dis-
putes.  
If parties go beyond the generally recognised arbitration institutions such as the 
ICC, LCIA, SIAC SCC, and DIA, the parties should ensure that the institution actually 
handles the type of dispute, which may arise out of the contract in question (IT, insur-
ance, maritime issues, specific types of raw material, etc.).  And if the parties go beyond 
the general procedural rules, such as the number of arbitrators, the place of arbitration, 
language, and choice of law, it may also be reasonable to examine whether the desig-
nated institution's rules of arbitration allow such changes and additions.  
As a main rule it cannot, however, be recommended to state in the arbitration 
agreement that “Institution X’s rejection of the case does not imply the lapse of the 
arbitration agreement,” let alone adding an alternative institution Y.  First, such desig-
nations are not strictly necessary in order for an operable arbitration agreement to exist.  
Second, proposals for such additions may open a “Pandora’s box” and may lead to a 
deadlock in the negotiation.  Third, additional parts and alternatives in an arbitration 
provision notoriously increase the risk of contradictions and ambiguity, which at a min-
imum, risks delaying the arbitration procedure or the enforcement of the arbitration 
award.  
                                                      
290 GREENBERG ET AL., supra note 1, at 188.   
291 See Felipe Mutiz Tellez, Prima Facie Decisions on Jurisidictions of the Arbitration Institute of the Stockholm 
Chamber of Commerce: Towards Consolidation of a “Pro Arbitration” Approach, SCC INST. (2012), 
https://sccinstitute.com/media/29996/felipe-mutis-tellez_paper-on-scc-challenges-on-jurisdiction.pdf; David 
Ramsjo & Siri Stromberg, Manifest of Jurisdiction? A Selection of Decisisons of the Arbitration Institute of the 
Stockholm Chamber of Commerce Concerning the Prima Facie Existence of an Arbitration Agreement, SCC INST. 
(2012), https://sccinstitute.com/media/61989/prima_facie_decisions_-by_the_scc.pdf.  
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